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ARTICLES

LISTENING TO DEAF CULTURE: A
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF DIFFERENCE
ANALYSIS UNDER TITLE VII
Mary Ellen Maatman'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' balances employees'
civil rights and employers' business needs.2 It prohibits discrimination
in hiring, firing, compensation, or "terms, conditions, or privileges of

* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., 1981, Swarthmore
College; J.D., 1985, University of Pennsylvania.
I wish to thank my colleagues at Widener for their advice and support, especially Michael
J. Goldberg, Laurie Magid, Kathy Nelson, and Teresa Wallace. My research assistants, Paul Berman
and Cathy Hopfe, have offered extraordinary support with their superlative research and analysis
skills. Finally, my parents have given me unfailing encouragement, and my husband, Arnie
Schwartz, has been patient beyond measure.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
2. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (explaining that Title
VII reflects employer, employee, and consumer interests in efficient and trustworthy workmanship).
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employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.3

Likewise,

it prohibits

"limit[ation],

segregat[ion],

or

classiflication] [of] employees or applicants... in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee" because of the

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.4 At the same
time, it permits employers to engage in legitimate business practices,'
denoted either "a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ")
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business8
7
These two defenses
or enterprise," 6 or a "business necessity."

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Cases brought under this section of the statute allege
disparate treatment discrimination. The gist of disparate treatment is intentional discrimination. See
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 792.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Claims brought under this section of the statute allege disparate
impact discrimination, which consists of use of employment practices that are "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Ward's
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422

U.S. 405 (1975).
5. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). This affirmative defense to allegations of disparate treatment
discrimination is known as the "BFOQ" (bona fide occupational qualification) defense. By its terms,
the defense does not apply to discrimination on the basis of race or color. Id. By judicial
interpretation, the defense is considered narrow. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37
(1977). Because disparate treatment allegations concern intentional discrimination, invocation of the
BFOQ defense tacitly acknowledges (at least, for the purposes of argument) that the employer has
discriminated. See Norwood v. Dale Maintenance Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 n.3 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
7. The courts invented this defense to disparate impact discrimination, and Congress wrote it
into the statute with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to clarify its terms and
legislatively reverse a line of Supreme Court cases that had narrowed the protections of Title VII.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1994) (business necessity defense); Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1489-90 (1994) (describing purposes of Civil Rights Act of 1991). The
defense is broader than the BFOQ exception, and permits an employer to continue using a facially
neutral policy that disproportionately disadvantages a protected group if the employer can
"demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Two factors temper the defense.
First, "demonstrate" means that the employer must carry the burden of proof on the issue. See id.
§ 2000e-(m) (Supp. V 1994). Second, an employer that carries this burden may still fail if "the
complaining party" can show that the employer failed to adopt a less discriminatory alternative that
would accomplish the employer's purposes. See id. §§ (k)(1)(A)(ii), (K)(1)(C).
8. There is also a defense based on use of a bona fide seniority or merit system. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h) (1988) (bona fide seniority and merit systems may be used to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment). In addition,
employers can "give and act upon the results of any professionally developed ability tests, provided"
that it is not "designed, intended or used to discriminate." Id.
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balance employers' interests against Title VII's anti-discrimination
mandate by ensuring that Title VII enforcement will "not... interfere9
unnecessarily with legitimate business operations and decisions."
Employers may not discriminate, but Title VII "preserv[es] . . . an
employer's remaining freedom of choice." 10
If the courts cannot consistently strike Title VII's balance, then they
cannot consistently realize the statute's purpose of ending employment
discrimination. In particular, Title VII's effectiveness is undermined,
and the harms of discrimination go unvindicated,"2 whenever courts fail
to clearly define the scope of Title VII's protected categories or
defenses. Unfortunately, Title VII's balance has gone awry when courts
have confronted cases in three areas, which can be gathered together
under the rubric of "difference analysis."13
The three areas of difference analysis embrace cases addressing
employment policies directed at stereotyped, biological, and cultural
differences. In these cases, themes of norm-centered equality and
difference as privilege have diverted the courts from analysis consistent
with Title VII's purposes and balance. Norm-centered conceptions of
equality lead the courts to accept employer policies directed at difference
as rational business judgments, rather than to consider the possibility that
such policies are discriminatory under Title VII. By measuring
employers' policies against an equality requirement that "like employees
receive like treatment," the courts do not recognize inequalities that stem
from different treatment meted out to different employees.. To the
contrary, the courts' norm-centered perspective prompts them to regard
difference as unreasonable privilege-seeking. In that light, courts treat

9. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240 (discussing Title ViI's design to leave to employers their
legitimate management prerogatives).

10. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
11. Title VII is a remedial statute.

Its passage was compelled by "the seriousness and

solemnity of our national policy denouncing discrimination." Mardell,31 F.3d at 1235.
12. See id. at 1232-33 (describing the nature of Title VII injuries); H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d

Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 15 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 553 (Committee Report
for Civil Rights Act of 1991).
13. The term "difference analysis"-or terms like it--have been applied to cases involving sexbased biological differences, such as pregnancy and childbirth. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode,
DefinitionsofDifference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 197-212 (Deborah
L. Rhode ed., 1990) (discussing legal analysis of gender differences); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE

AND GENDER 96, 106 (1989) (referring to "difference-oriented frameworks"); see generally Sylvia
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984) (emphasizing biological
difference as the focal point of a proposed approach to equal protection analysis in gender cases).
This article applies the term to a broader range of cases, but includes the biological difference cases

within its scope.
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employee differences as infringements on employers' interests, even
when employers' policies infringe upon employees' interests in
protection from discrimination.
Commentators have noticed and criticized the courts' difficulties,
but have not generated a workable corrective to difference analysis and
its distorting themes. No commentator has recognized that the varied
forms of difference analysis may all be of one piece, let alone that
common difference analysis problems may point to one solution.
Instead, the bulk of scholarly attention to difference analysis has come
from feminist theorists focused on the biological difference problems of
pregnancy and childbearing."4
These theorists have generated two leading schools of thought
regarding the courts' approaches to biological difference. One school
of thought advocates an "equal treatment" model that conceptualizes
equality as a requirement that similarly situated persons should be treated
alike. 5 The second school of thought criticizes the first for granting
women equality only when they are similarly situated to men. Therefore,
this school of thought advocates a "special treatment" model that
conceptualizes equality as achievement of "equal results." In turn, this
equality model has been criticized for risking relegation of women to
separate spheres such as those created by "protective legislation" that
hampered women's employment opportunities. 16 The special treatment
position is also vulnerable to criticism that claims for special treatment
are philosophically inconsistent with the meaning of equality. t7
This debate has roiled on for years, but has largely failed to
influence the courts' approach to difference analysis.' 8 True, the equal
treatment theorists helped to shape early judicial and legislative efforts

14. See, e.g., FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:

FOUNDATIONs (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993)

[hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]. Only seven of the 38 essays in this collection make no reference to
pregnancy, reproduction, or childbearing. Only one of the 12 essays specifically addressing equality
theory omits any reference to pregnancy, reproduction, or childbearing.

15. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special TreatmentDebate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984-85).
16. See, e.g., Katherine Bartlett, Pregnancyand the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62
CAL. L. REv. 1532, 1533 (1974); Williams, supra note 15, at 325; cf Mary E. Becker, From Muller
v. Oregon to Fetal VulnerabilityPolicies,53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219 (1986) (describing protectionist
legislation and its effects on women's opportunities).
17. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference andDominance,in FOUNDATIONS, supranote 14,
at 276-77 (describing special treatment argument as "something of a doctrinal embarrassment").
18. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out Of The
Maternity And The Workplace Debate, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at 190-207.
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to produce gender equality; 9 however, the limitations of the approach
have surfaced frequently enough to inspire its refinement and
rearticulation many times over.20 As for special treatment, the courts

have shown little interest in the approach; indeed, the current political
and jurisprudential climate strongly disfavors it.2'

This stalemate has produced a new generation of equality models.22
Some of these new approaches consist of variations on, or modifications
of, one of the two schools of thought.2 3 Others represent new departures.24 Whatever the approach, it seems fair to say that most participants in the equality debate recognize-at least implicitly--that the
'
debate has "an insoluble quality."25
Lucinda Finley has suggested that the debate has been largely
ineffectual because equality analysis cannot "come to terms in any
'
acceptable, unproblematic manner with the reality of human variety."26
I agree. I would go even further, and suggest that focus on biological

difference has blinded us to the recurring analytic patterns that mar all
areas of difference analysis. More specifically, I suggest that an
examination of the whole of difference analysis reveals a pattern of
recurrent themes that can only be addressed by consideration of the
practical effects of difference upon Title VIl's promise of equality of

19. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality'sRiddle: PregnancyAnd The Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, in FOUNDATIONS, supranote 14, at 130-43.
20. See, e.g., id.; Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case- of Pregnancy, I
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1985); see generally D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction To PartThree,
in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at 211-20 (summarizing new directions in the equality debate).
21. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Paul C. Roberts,
Everybody EqualBut White Males, ROCKY MTN. NEws (Denver), March 25, 1995, at 50A (editorial)
("[ain array of quota policies ... lavish employment and promotion privileges on women and other
'protected minorities' . . . [and] white male careers [in federal government are] on hold while those
privileged by skin color and genitalia take precedence"). But see California Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 294 (1987) (finding that Pregnancy Discrinination Act does not
prohibit preferential treatment consistent with Title VII's goals); see generally id. at 294 n.4
(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Court has not yet decided what is impermissible preferential
treatment under Title VII).
22. See D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction To Part Three, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at
211-20; Martha Chamallas, StructuralistAnd CulturalDomination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
ContemporaryInfluences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994) (describing emerging accounts of equality
and discrimination in all areas of Title VII scholarship); see also Martha Minow, When Difference
Has Its Home: Group Homes For The Mentally Retarded,Equal ProtectionAnd Legal Treatment
Of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 .(1987); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,
92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994).
23. See supra note 20.
24. See supra note 22.
25. Finley, supra note 18, at 194.
26. Finley, supra note 18, at 195.
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opportunity balanced with legitimate employer interests. Thus, Part II of
this article seeks to identify the patterns of difference analysis, and Part
III will discuss the limitations of the ongoing equality debate's response
to those patterns.
In place of these flawed approaches to difference, Part IV will
explore the lessons of Deaf culture27 for difference analysis. Deaf
culture stems primarily from the Deaf experience with American Sign
Language ("ASL"), which has its own grammar, syntax, and folkloric
and bardic traditions.2 8 This language enables its users to communicate
as fully, with as much richness, as any non-deaf person's primary
spoken language. 29 Yet, norm-centered attitudes, and a concomitant
sense that accommodation to difference grants an unfair privilege,
prompted hearing educators of the deaf to attempt to eradicate ASL and
replace it entirely with "normal" mimicry of speech and hearing.3"
Thus, the history of Deaf culture is a history of the results of the two
themes that have pervaded Title VII difference analysis. The results-which have ill-served many deaf people in their efforts to fully
function and communicate-comprise the lessons of Deaf culture.
Part V of this article will use these lessons to reconceptualize
difference analysis. In turn, this reconceptualization generates principles
that replace the themes of norm-centered equality and difference as
privilege with a functional approach that restores Title VII's conception
of opportunity-based equality, and appropriately balances employer and
employee interests.
HI.

DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS IN DISARRAY:

THE COURTS' APPROACH

Difference analysis cases arise when an employer has made an
employment decision based upon a characteristic that differs from the
employer's desired norm.' The workers who possess the "different"
characteristic comprise a subgroup within one of Title VII's protected
categories; yet, Title VII's traditional forms of disparate impact and

27. A convention of Deaf culture scholarship is to denote "deafness" or "deaf' as a physical
condition with a lower case "d," and "deafness" or "deaf" in the cultural sense with an upper case
"D." See CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VoicEs FROM A CULTURE 2,
39 (1988); JEROME D. SCHEIN, AT HOME AMONG STRANGERS 6-7 (1989); Andrew Solomon, Deaf
Is Beautiful, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 28, 1994, at 40.
28. See generally PADDEN & HUMPHRIEs, supra note 27.

29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra notes 378-93 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 13.
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disparate treatment analysis do not address their situation. Disparate
impact analysis generally fails in these cases because the employers'
policies affect only a portion of a protected class, which is too small to

evidence disparate impact.32 As for disparate treatment, the courts are

stymied by the fact that the policies at issue are not explicitly directed at
protected categories, but only at traits associated with these categories. 33
For example, many early difference cases involved policies that affected

only female or male employees, which the courts dubbed "sex-plus"
policies.34 The name referred to the fact that the policies appeared not

to be directed at sex, but at sex "plus" some other characteristic. 35

Difference analysis had its genesis in these sex-plus cases, in which
the employer's policies targeted traits stereotypically associated with
gender.36 As Title VII jurisprudence expanded, so did the scope of
application of "sex-plus" concepts. For example, the courts have

addressed whether certain hairstyle prohibitions constitute race discrimination.3 7 Similarly, men have challenged no-beard rules on the grounds

of religious and race discrimination.38

Outside the grooming area,

32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding no
disparate impact because the evidence did not show greater effect of no beard policy on blacks
versus whites). But see EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 1981) (holding that
pseudofolliculitis barbae [hereinafter PFB] is an African American trait that renders no beard policy
a disparate impact violation of Title VII).
33. E.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d at 188.
34. Rhode, supra note 13, at 92-98.
35. Rhode, supra note 13, at 92-98.
36. Rhode, supra note 13, at 92-98 (discussing early sex-plus cases); see, e.g., Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (female applicant successfully challenged employer's
refusal to hire women with pre-school aged children); Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir.
1977) (female employee successfully challenged the employer's compulsory name-change policy
for married women); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (male
employee unsuccessfully challenged employer's hair length rules applied only to men); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (female employees successfully challenged
employer's prohibition against marriage for female employees); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (successful challenge of employer's gender-differentiated dress
and grooming codes).
37. See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(unsuccessfully arguing that employer's prohibition of "corn row" hair styles was racially
discriminatory); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(similarly holding that employer's prohibition was racially discriminatory).
38. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993) (black males with
race-based medical condition that precludes facial shaving challenged fire department's no-beard
rule adopted to facilitate use of respirator masks); Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382
(9th Cir. 1984) (adherent to the Sikh religion, which proscribes cutting or shaving of body hair,
challenged employer's no-beard rule for employees whose duties required use of gas-tight sealing
respirators); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); Smith v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 486 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1973) (black males challenged employer's no-mustache, short sideburn
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employees whose primary language is other than English have challenged
English-only workplace rules, on the grounds that such rules constitute
national origin discrimination.39 Some cases (such as those involving
child care, hair length, dress codes, and surnames) center on traits
stereotypicallyassociated with protected categories; other cases (such as
those involving PFB,40 pregnancy, and childbirth) center on traits
biologically associated with protected categories; still other cases (such
as those involving corn row hairstyles, religious challenges to grooming
rules, and English-only rules) center on traits culturally associated with
the protected category.
This expansion of "sex-plus" concepts beyond gender bounds
necessitates use of the broader "difference analysis" term to denote and
conceptually relate all such cases.4 ' The common thread in all these
cases is a conception of equality ill-suited to the realities of difference.
Repair of the resulting disarray must begin with an attempt to accurately
trace the nature and scope of the flaws of difference analysis, beginning
with its origins in "sex-plus" litigation, and proceeding to its evolution
in biological and cultural difference cases.
A.

The Flawed Origins of Difference Analysis: "Sex-plus" and
Stereotyped Difference

In retrospect, some early sex-plus cases seem comical, based as they
are on controversies centered on now-dated stereotypes. It is hard to
recall why long hair once seemed to matter so much;42 similarly, the
policy on grounds that blacks had more difficulty complying with the rule). African American men
who have challenged no beard rules have done so because they suffer from PFB, "which causes
men's faces to become infected if they shave them." Fitzpatrick,2 F.3d at 1114. The disorder
disproportionately affects black males. Id.
39. See, eig., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc denied,
13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
40. See supra note 32.
41. This suggestion is not novel. See Peter B. Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the
Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 769 (1987) (suggesting the

term "mutability analysis" for grooming and language cases, and critiquing extant analysis as unduly
restrictive).

42. The apparent triviality of hair length rules for male employees has favored employers,
despite the obvious irrelevance of hair length to actual performance. Id. at 769. As Professor Bayer

reports, "not one prevailing court of appeals decision has held that grooming codes restricting the
hair length of male employees are sexually discriminatory." Id. at 837. Professor Bayer argues that

the courts have ignored the significance of hair length. Id. at 868. I agree that male hair length and
style may have political significance; however, Professor Bayer's analysis seems vulnerable because
he adopts the very analysis he criticizes. The only difference is that Professor Bayer defines the
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idea of forcing women to wear uniforms for fear they would dress
inappropriately 43 now seems laughable. That we can now see the
stereotypes for what they are reveals the very conundrum posed by sexplus jurisprudence:
in these cases, courts confront differentiated
treatment based on stereotyped assumptions, but their adjudication of
these cases frequently turns upon those same stereotypes.
The conundrum's significance becomes clearer when the stakes are
higher, as in other early sex-plus cases involving employers' unfavorable
treatment of women with pre-school age children, 4 or married women.45 In these early cases, plaintiffs lost when judges' own sex-based
stereotypes led them to conclude that such policies did not discriminate
on the basis of sex."
1. Three Steps Forward: Phillips,Diaz, and Sprogis
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the trial court granted
defendant's summary judgment motion because it deemed Martin
Marietta's employment of men with pre-school age children irrelevant
to a claim that its refusal to hire women with pre-school age children
was sex discrimination.47 As the court saw it, the employer's treatment
of men was irrelevant to the case because "[tihe responsibilities of men
and women with small children are not the same, and employers are
entitled to recognize these different responsibilities in establishing hiring
policies. 48 From this assumption, the court concluded that there was
no evidence that "defendant discriminated against the plaintiff because
the plaintiff is a woman. 49 This conclusion accorded with Martin
Marietta's implicit argument that discrimination against only a portion
of a protected class is not discrimination against the class, so long as the
category of fundamental rights more broadly than does the Fifth Circuit.
43. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 & n.16
(7th Cir. 1979) (finding Title VII was violated by employer who allowed men to wear "customary
business attire" but required women to wear uniforms, euphemistically described as "career
ensembles").
44. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2129 (M.D. Fla. 1968)
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment), affd, 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), reh'g
en bane denied,416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).

45. See, e.g., Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1194 (finding no-marriage rule for women stewardesses
violated Title VII); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967) (finding nomarriage rule for women did not violate Title VII), appeal dismissed,No. 25,698 (5th Cir. 1968).
46. Rhode, supra note 13, at 197-212.

47. 69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2129 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
48. Id. at 2129.

49. Id.
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portion suffers because of a "neutral" criterion."
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court, albeit on
slightly different grounds.5 As the Fifth Circuit saw it, the issue was
whether the employer's application of its no pre-school age children
policy was "discrimination based on 'sex' within the meaning of Title
VII12 In the Fifth Circuit's view, the answer was no: "[t]he discrimination was based on a two-pronged qualification, i.e., a woman with preschool age children. Ida Phillips was not refused employment because
she was a woman nor because she had pre-school age children.""3 In
so reasoning, the court read Title VII narrowly, to reach only discrimination on classifications "named within the Act itself."54
Conceding that the policy "is arguably an apparent discrimination
founded upon sex,"55 the court nonetheless dismissed that possibility.
First, the court strongly intimated that it would accept the policy as a
BFOQ even if it found the policy discriminatory.5 6 Second, the court
simply did not find the policy violated Title VII because it could not
believe that Congress intended "sex" to be construed broadly enough to
prohibit distinctions based upon "normal" sex roles and child-rearing
practices. 7 To the contrary, the court felt that "[tihe common experience of Congressmen is surely not so far removed from that of mankind
in general as to warrant our attributing to them such an irrational purpose
in the formulation of this statute."58
On petition for rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit simply denied
the petition with a terse per curiam statement.5 9 Three judges dissented.
They found it obvious that the employer's policy was sex-based because
"[i]t is the fact of the person being a mother, i.e., a woman-not the age
of the children, which denies employment opportunity to a woman which
is open to a man. ','60 The dissenters, coining the "sex-plus" phrase to
50. Thus, Martin Marietta argued a kind of "bottom line" defense 13 years before the Supreme

Court rejected that defense. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). Set against early
difference cases such as Phillips, Teal can be read as a rejection of a disparate impact variation on
"sex plus" logic. Id. at 455-56.
51. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. Id. at 2.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
See id. (referring to "the differences between the normalrelationships of working fathers

and working mothers to their pre-school age children") (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969).
60. Id. at 1259.
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refer to the majority's view that no actionable discrimination stems from
a policy based on "another criterion of employment ... added to one of
the classifications listed in the Act,"'" bluntly stated the problem with
the analysis: "[i]f 'sex-plus' stands, the Act is dead ....
Free to add
non-sex factors, the rankest sort of discrimination against women can be
worked by employers."'62
Ultimately, the Supreme Court addressed the Phillips case with a
cryptic per curiam opinion, which reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. 3 The Court could have clarified Title VII and said that employment policies based on sex-based stereotypes violate the statute. It did
not do so. The Court simply said-without elaboration-that Title VII
"requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex."' Given that the whole controversy centered on the question of what is and is not "irrespective
of... sex," this approach was less than helpful.
Worse yet, the Court noted in dicta that "[t]he existence
of ... conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to
job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis
for distinction" as a bona fide occupational qualification under the
Act. 6' Thus, even the Supreme Court "[fell] into the trap of assuming
that the Act permits ancient canards about the proper role of women to
be a basis for discrimination. 66 Distracted by such stereotyped
assumptions, all that the Supreme Court did in Phillips was shift the
arena of dispute from the threshold question of discrimination to the
BFOQ defense.
On the BFOQ question, the Fifth Circuit had produced precedent
that blunted employers' ability to exploit the Supreme Court's dicta in
Phillips. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,67 the Fifth
61. Id. at 1260.
62. Id.

63. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
64. Id.
65. Id. Years later, the Court read this dicta as a holding, by stating: "t]he question in
[Phillips]was whether the discrimination in question could be justified under § 703(e) as a BFOQ."
UAW v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 1196, 1203 (1991). This otherwise puzzling dicta makes
sense if read as a statement that Phillipsultimately boiled down to a BFOQ question. In fact, the
Supreme Court remanded Phillips on that question, but its opinion is the last reported decision in
the case.
66. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Court's stumble may be

explained by then-Chief Justice Burger's personal views. By some accounts, Burger-like his
colleagues in the lower Phillipscourts-believed that women with young children were not as good
employees as men. See STEPHEN ARMSTRONG & BOB WOODWARD, THE BRETHREN 123 (1979).

67. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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Circuit found the defendant employer violated Title VII when it refused
to hire men for flight attendant positions. 6 Because Pan Am conceded
that it hired only women for these positions, the parties stipulated that
the issue was whether "being a female" was a BFOQ for work as a flight
attendant.69 The trial court had accepted this argument," which was
based on evidence that Pan Am deemed women better than men at
'providing reassurance to .anxious passengers, giving courteous
personalized service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as
possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft operations.' 's7 In
addition, the trial court found that "Pan Am's passengers overwhelmingly preferred to be served by female stewardesses."' The Fifth Circuit
reversed, and agreed with the EEOC's argument that the BFOQ
exception should be interpreted narrowly, so as not to swallow the rule
of Title VII.73
Using this narrow BFOQ analysis, the Fifth Circuit found that Pan
Am's defense involved merely tangential aspects of its business, while
"discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one
sex exclusively."'74 As for customer preferences, the Fifth Circuit found
that they could not be the basis of a BFOQ defense because "it would be
totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of
the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid."7'
The combined effect of Phillips and Diaz was demonstrated in
Sprogis v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc.7 6 In that case, female flight attendants
challenged United's application of a no-marriage rule to its female
attendants but not to its male attendants.77 The airline defended its
policy on two grounds. First, it followed Martin Marietta's lead, and
argued that the policy was not discriminatory because it was based on a
neutral, "sex-plus" factor.78 Second, it followed Pan Am's lead, and

68. Id. at 389.
69. Id. at 386.
70. Id.; see also Diaz v. Pan Am. Airlines, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 568-69 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
rev'd, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
71. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387 (quoting the trial court's findings),

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 388 (emphasis in original).
Id.
at 389.
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,404 U.S. 991 (1971).

77. Id. at 1196.

78. See id. at 1197-98.
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argued that the policy was a BFOQ.79 Citing Phillips in its analysis of
the first argument, and Diaz in its analysis of the second argument, the
Seventh Circuit rejected both theories.80
In response to the "sex-plus" argument, the Seventh Circuit followed

the EEOC's view that "'so long as sex is a factor in the application of
the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex."' 8
Thus, the Seventh Circuit read Title VII to prohibit more than "explicit
'
discriminations based 'solely' on sex."82
To the contrary, "Congress

intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men

and women resulting from sex stereotypes."83 Nor did the Seventh
Circuit view this spectrum narrowly; rather, it pointedly noted that

neither biological
nor stereotypical differences could justify a discrimina84
tory policy.
The determination that United's policy was sex-based discrimina-

tion meant that United could only prevail if it established that an
unmarried status was a BFOQ for female flight attendants. United failed
to do so.8
The only reason United could offer for requiring its
stewardesses to be single was that "it received complaints from husbands
about their wives' working schedules and the irregularity of their
working hours. 86 Not surprisingly, the Seventh Circuit found that
spouses' complaints were unrelated to their wives' job qualifications,
especially when concerns about a few employees' domestic arrangements were used to bar employment of all married women.87 The

court, therefore, found marital status unrelated to job performance, and,

79. See id. at 1198-1201.
80. See id. at 1197-1201.
81. Id. at 1198 (quoting EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (1994)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754,759-60 (M.D.
Ala. 1969), and the Supreme Court's Phillips opinion, 400 U.S. at 591.
85. Id. at 1198-99.
86. Id. at 1199. Apparently, United thought that married women could only work on the terms
their husbands permitted them. Of course, that idea is a stereotype that was once enshrined in the
legal fiction that .'the husband and wife are regarded as one person, and her legal existence and
authority in a degree lost or suspended, during the continuance of the matrimonial union."'
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 184 (1985) (quoting 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 129 (2d ed. 1832)). Interestingly, United dressed the old
stereotype in modem clothes, by putting on expert testimony of psychiatrists and marriage counselors
to the effect that "marriage tends to bring about changes in job attitudes which seriously
impair... effectiveness as stewardesses. They tend to become preoccupied with their marital
responsibilities, less dedicated, less sensitive to the needs of passengers and more resentful towards
their jobs." Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1207 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1199.
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citing Diaz, that passenger preferences for single stewardesses did not
constitute a BFOQ."8
2.

A Giant Step Back: Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co.

Sprogis has been much-cited, 9 but it was not the last word on sexplus analysis. A male job applicant's desire to wear long hair presented
another opportunity for the courts to determine whether inclusion of sex
as a factor in an employment policy rendered the policy discriminatory
under Title VII 9 Trivial as hair length may be, the case has profoundly affected sex-plus and difference analysis.
In July 1970, Alan Willingham applied for a copy layout artist
position with Macon Telegraph Publishing Company.9
Macon
Telegraph rejected Willingham's application because it "object[ed] to the
length of his hair."' Specifically, Macon Telegraph felt that exclusion
of "men (but not women) with long hair" was a necessary concession to
the tastes of its advertisers and subscribers, who were "particularly sour
on youthful long-haired males. 93 Such an argument sounds like a
BFOQ defense patterned after the airlines' customer preference
arguments in Sprogis and Weeks. Nonetheless, the trial court saw the
issue as whether the policy was sex discrimination, at all.94
On this issue, the district court found for the employer with a
decision steeped in stereotypical thinking. 95 The court reasoned that
Willingham's reading of Title VII would mean that "men... could not
be prevented by the employer from wearing dresses to work if the
employer permitted women to wear dresses .... [I]t would not be at all
illogical to include lipstick, eyeshadow, earrings, and other items of

88. Id.
89. A search of the LEXIS database for Shepard's Federal Citations through September 1995
reveals 254 federal and state court citations to Sprogis.

90. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1975) (en bane)
[hereinafter Willingham II].

91. Id. at 1086-87.
92. Id. at 1086. These objections were founded upon the Macon community's recent
experience with a nearby music festival, which attracted some 500,000 .'[b]earded and long-haired
youths and scantily dressed young women .... [whose] [u]se of drugs and marijuana was open.

Complete nudity by both sexes although not common was frequently observed."' Id. at 1087
(citing Willingham v. Macon Tel., Co., 482 F.2d 535, 539 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973)) [hereinafter
Willingham I].
93. Willingham I, 482 F.2d at 539 & n.3 (Simpson, J.,
dissenting).
94. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972),
aft'd, 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
95. Id. at 1022.
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typical female attire... and bedeckment. '9 6 Such reasoning suited the
well-ingrained expectations of 1972, but ultimately proved weak. In later
years, courts have struck down at least some employer restrictions upon
female dress, 97 as well as requirements that female employees use
cosmetics. 98 Similarly, a male employee who wears an earring, or a
female employee "who shaves her head as clean as a billiard ball" 99
may not yet the commonplace, but neither do they seem impossibly
absurd in this age of Andre Agassi and Sinead O'Connor. In sum, the
reasoning fails to hold consistently, and works only when tested against
a "parade of horribles" flaunting extant norms. When the norms change,
so does the result.0 0
The Fifth Circuit briefly seemed to recognize as much. In 1973, it
reversed the district court t 'l by following Sprogis and broadly construing Title VII to prohibit "all differences in the treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."'0" Two years later, the Fifth
Circuit reheard the case en banc, and did an about face:0 3 it now
decided that the statute's scanty legislative history indicated that
Congress could not have meant "for its proscription of sexual discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications.""' Not only did
the Fifth Circuit abandon its earlier acceptance of Willingham's
argument, but it now endorsed the approach it had earlier rejected. The
court's en banc affirmation of the district court opinion was authored by

96. Id. at 1020.

97. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979);
O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
98. Cf. Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding Title VII
violated by make-up rule implemented as a pretext to discharge a pregnant employee who would not
wear makeup because of her religious beliefs).
99. Willingham, 352 F.Supp. at 1021.
100. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress And Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, And Workplace Equality, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 2541 (1994) (analyzing dress and
grooming decisions as a jurisprudence grounded in community norms).
101. 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973). For simplicity and clarity's sake, this initial Fifth Circuit
opinion will be denoted as Willingham I, even though it is not customarily referred to as such-ar
even referred to, at all.
102. Id. at 537-38 (citing Sprogis, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991

(1971)).
103. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 1090.

It is true that the legislative history of the statute's inclusion of sex is

"notable primarily for its brevity." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). What

is puzzling is that the Fifth Circuit used this opaque history to conclude that Congress did not intend
"significant and sweeping" consequences. The history is either illuminating or not, and its brevity

no more connotes an intent for narrow change than an intent for broad change.
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Judge Simpson, who dissented from Willingham .105
a.

Willingham Hf's Flawed Reasoning

Alan Willingham had characterized the employer's grooming
standards as discriminatory by arguing that the policy "involve[d] the
classification of employees on the basis of sex plus one other ostensibly
neutral characteristic."' 0 6 In 1973, the Fifth Circuit regarded such a
classification as discrimination. Now, the Fifth Circuit saw the argument
as "an equal protection gloss upon the statute, i.e., similarly situated
individuals of either sex cannot be discriminated against vis d vis
members of their own sex unless the same distinction is made with
respect to those of the opposite sex."'0 7 In other words, the court
seems to have understood Willingham to be arguing that the defendant
favored short-haired over long-haired men, rather than that the employer
enforced gender stereotypes by granting women more hairstyle latitude
08
than it did men.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of this issue acknowledged Phillips and
Sprogis, as it had to."0 9 Moreover, it acknowledged that several district
courts had followed Sprogis to find sex-differentiated grooming codes
violated Title VI."' The court then proceeded to ignore the lower
court grooming cases-as an appellate court may do-and to read
Phillips and Sprogis in the narrowest way possible. This narrow reading
was easily accomplished with Phillips,which so cryptically had said so
little. Yet, Sprogis had stated that "[t]he effect of the statute is not to be
105. Judges Tuttle and Wisdom, who comprised the Willingham I majority, dissented from the
Willingham H en bane opinion. Willingham 17, 507 F.2d at 1093.

106. Id. at 1089 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. The Fifth Circuit's issue formulation in Willingham 11 sounds suspiciously like Martin
Marietta's defense in Phillips. Just as the Fifth Circuit saw the grooming policy as a distinction
favoring short-haired over long-haired men, Martin Marietta had argued that it was merely favoring

women without small children over women with small children. This issue formulation also echoed
the defendant's Willingham I theory:
The company contends that its grooming code does not discriminate on the basis of sex
because both sexes are treated equally: all applicants and employees are required to

groom their hair according to the prevailing community standard. It is argued that the
discrimination, if any, is between long and short haired males and not between males and
females.

482 F.2d at 537. In Willingham 1,the court rejected this argument. See 507 F.2d at 1084.
109. Willingham 11,507 F.2d at 1089.

110. Id. at 1090 (citing Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972);
Donohue v. Shoe Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337
F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971)).
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diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the
protected class.... At the same time, Diaz had foreclosed a BFOQ
justification for discrimination based on customer preferences or other
non-essential grounds.!1 2 Thus boxed in, the court decided that some
stereotype-driven policies may violate Title VII, but other stereotypedriven policies, including Macon Telegraph's, do not."'
Specifically, the court held that Title VII forbids discrimination "on
the basis
of immutable characteristics, such as race and national
origin."'4 As for mutable characteristics, the court drew the line
between discrimination and non-discrimination at "distinctions grounded
on such fundamental rights as the right to have children or to marry and
those interfering with the manner in which an employer exercises his
11
judgment as to the way to operate a business.""
Finding hair length
neither immutable nor a matter of "fundamental right," the court
concluded that Macon Telegraph's policy did not violate Title VII." 6
This reasoning effectively rendered Title VII a narrow truism. The
"immutability" and "fundamental rights" rubrics merely provided broad
terms to cover all of Title VII's explicit categories, along with the
precedent the court could not ignore. Thus, "immutable characteristics"
covers the Title VII categories of race, color, national origin, and sex.
Similarly, "fundamental rights" covers the Title VII category of religion
and accounts for the Sprogis and Phillips decisions. As for Diaz, the
Fifth Circuit avoided it by stopping inquiry at the threshold question of
discrimination. This analytic shell game allowed employers to defend
policies that would never pass muster under Title VII's BFOQ defense.
b.

Willingham I's Flawed Test

Succeeding courts have applied Willingham I's mutability/fundamental rights test to all manner of cases. For example, most
courts have upheld hair length rules, but at least one court regarded hair
length as "'an ingredient of an individual's personal liberty.' 1 1.
Similarly, courts usually uphold gender-differentiated dress codes;

II1.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
Dwen v.

444 F.2d at 1198.
442 F.2d at 387-89.
See Willingham 11, 507 F.2d at 1089-91.
Id. at 1091.
Id.
Id.
See Longo v. Carlisle De Coppet & Co., 403 F. Supp. 692, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting
Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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however, some courts have found Title VII violations when employers
force female employees to wear revealing uniforms, which the courts
perceived as infringements on the female employees' privacy rights." 8
Still another court found a Title VII violation when an employer forced
female employees to wear arguably unattractive, but unrevealing,

uniforms." 9 Cases imposing weight standards upon flight attendants
depended upon a showing that weight is not easily controlled, and,

hence, immutable; some plaintiffs assembled such evidence, and some
did not. 2 In sum, the Willingham II test produces inconsistent results.
Ultimately, the test turns upon the vagaries of the stereotyped
preconceptions, or lack of them, in the minds of the different judges who
decide each case. For the most part, this dependence on stereotypes has
favored employers. Citing Willingham J1,"' the courts have upheld
stereotype-based policies restricting male grooming,' 22 male and female

118. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Marentette v.
Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (stating that "a sexually provocative
dress code imposed as a condition of employment which subjects persons to sexual harassment could
well violate the true spirit and literal language of Title VII.").
119. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (reversing
district court's decision that uniform requirement imposed on female employees was merely an
employer preference rather than a Title VII violation). The Seventh Circuit cited Sprogis and
stereotyping concepts to find that the uniform policy violated Title VII because it tended to mark
female employees as subordinates, in contrast to the non-uniformed male employees. Id. at 1030-33.
Even this court could not break out of the forms of traditional equality analysis, as it observed that
"Title VII does not require that uniforms be abolished but that defendant's similarly situated
employees be treated in an equal manner." Id. at 1031. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit's
seeming divergence from Willingham II actually turned on its willingness to see the employer's
policy as discrimination against women "vis-h-vis" men. If it had agreed with the defendant's
stereotyped argument that "women cannot be expected to exercise good judgment in choosing
business apparel, whereas men can," id. at 1033 n.17, it presumably would have upheld the policy
because it would have regarded women and men as differently situated. See, e.g., id. at 1034 (Pell,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing "essential uniformity of male garb and the lack of that uniformity among
women").
120. See Association of Flight Attendants v. Ozark Air Lines, 470 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
121. This survey reflects the work of my research assistant, Cathy Hopfe.
122. See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v.
Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v. Carlisle De
Coppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Brown v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 523 F.2d 725, 728-29
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Tex. 1975);
Wamsganz v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. Supp. 306, 307 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd sub nom.
Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78
F.R1D. 460, 469 (N.D. Cal. 1978); McConnell v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 389 F. Supp. 594, 596
(N.D. Tex. 1975); Pik-Kwik Stores, Inc. v. Commission On Human Rights and Opportunities, 365
A.2d 1210, 1212 (Conn. 1976); Planchet v. New Hampshire Hosp., 341 A.2d 267, 268-69 (N.H.
1975); Indiana Civ. Rights Comm'n v. Sutherland Lumber, 394 N.E.2d 949, 957 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979); Bedker v. Domino's Pizza, 491 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Lockhart v.
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dress,'23 female height and weight,124 marriage, 125
menstruation'128
1 27
related absences, 126 effeminacy, and female "uppitiness.'
B.

Biological Difference Cases

Post-Willingham IIjurisprudence reflects the power of stereotypes,
and the failure of legal analysis to counter the stereotypes. Biological
difference has equally troubled the courts, producing a nearly infamous
line of cases rescued from their illogic only by Congressional amendment
of Title VII. In recent years, the underlying logic of the legislative
rescue effort has likewise become questionable, despite its improvement
29
on the courts' initial pass at sex-based biological difference.
1. Round One: The Courts Apply Sex-plus Concepts To Pregnancy
In the mid-1970's, the Supreme Court decided three problematic
biological difference cases. The first of the cases, Geduldig v. Aiello,"30
was not a Title VII case. The second and third cases, General Elec. Co.

Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Albertson's, Inc. v. Washington State
Human Rights Comm'n, 544 P.2d 98, 100 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1005
(Wash. 1976).
123. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1983), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986); Lanigan v.
Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
124. See In re National Air Lines, 434 F. Supp. 269, 275-76 (S.D. Fla. 1977); see also Bartlett,
supra note 100, at 2561-63 (thoroughly critiquing the airline weight cases).
125. See Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 548
F.2d 356 (1977), cert.denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977) (no sex-plus discrimination if rule applies equally
to men).
126. See Jirak v. Federal Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
127. See Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978).
128. See Oaks v. Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1039 (S.D. Ala. 1981).
129. Not all biological difference cases involve gender and pregnancy. In the racial context,
black males with PFB have challenged no-beard policies. The courts generally have handled such
cases using disparate impact analysis and its business necessity defense. See, e.g., Bradley v.
Pizzaco, 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (no beard rule violated Title VII, and alleged customer
preference could not justify application of the policy to African American males with PFB);
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (firefighters unsuccessfully
challenged no beard rule, which court found was a business necessity because it was implemented
to ensure tight respirator seals); Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d at 191-95; Smith v. Delta Air
Lines, 486 F.2d 512, 513-14 (5th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Memphis Police Dep't, 713 F. Supp. 244,
245-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (African American males with PFB brought disparate impact challenge
to no beard rule for police officers); Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1152 (S.D.
Iowa 1984) (African American males with PFB brought disparate impact challenge to no beard rule).
130. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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v. Gilbert31 and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,132 were decided under
Title VII.
In Geduldig, the Court considered whether an employer-the State
of California-violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause by excluding pregnancy and childbirth from its employees'
disability insurance program.'3 3 The Court decided that California's
insurance program did not discriminate against women because "[t]here
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise,34
there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not."'
In other words, the program did not affect women vis-a-vis men; rather,
it distinguished between "pregnant women and non-pregnant persons." 35 Thus, the employer could exercise its business judgment to
maintain the fiscal integrity of its plan by excluding
pregnancy and
36
childbirth from the plan's covered disabilities.'
Although Geduldig was not a Title VII case, it laid the groundwork
for the Title VII cases that followed. In Gilbert, female employees
challenged their employer's disability plan as sex discrimination because
it excluded payments for pregnancy disabilities.' 37 Using Geduldig's
logic, the Court found that the employer's policy did not violate Title
VII' 38 Thus, the Court found the policy was not discriminatory.'
Nor could the plaintiffs demonstrate any adverse effect of the policy
upon women as a group because they could not prove that the benefit
package was worth more to the employer's male employees than to its
female employees. 40
In Satty, the Court once again applied its premise that a pregnancybased distinction is not a sex-based distinction.1 4' Thus, the Court
ruled that the employer's requirement that its pregnant employees take.

131. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
132. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
133. 417 U.S. at 486.
134. Id. at 496-97.
135. Id. at 496 n.20. Many commentators have remarked upon this phrasing, which conjures
up visions of pregnant men. Such criticism of Geduldig's phrasing is but one facet of widespread

disagreement with the decision. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 13, at 118-19
(describing the Court's phrasing as "memorable," and its logic as "incoherent, inconsistent, and
ultimately indefensible"); Law, supra note 13, at 982-85 (calling criticism of Geduldig a "cottage

industry").
136. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494-96.
137. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127-29.

138. See id. at 136.
139. Id.

140. Id. at 138-39.
141. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1977).
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an unpaid leave of absence did not violate Title VII. 42 In contrast, the
Court found the employer's elimination of previously accumulated
seniority for women returning from pregnancy leaves violated Title
VIIV4 3 This ostensibly neutral policy, targeted at sex-plus maternity
leaves, was discriminatory because it "imposed on women a substantial
burden that men need not suffer.""''
In the Court's view, this burdening differentiated the no-seniority policy from the unpaid maternity leave
policy; unlike the former policy, the latter one did not differently burden
men and women, but only "refused
to extend to women a benefit that
45
men cannot and do not receive."'
After Satty, the courts that addressed employment policies directed
at gender-based biological difference had to decide whether Gilbert or
Satty governed the case. This decision turned on determining whether
a policy burdened only one sex (and, therefore, was discrimination under
Satty), or simply refused to accord a benefit to the only sex that could
realize that benefit (and, therefore, was non-discrimination under Gilbert).
This distinction between benefits and burdens was not easily applied. As
the Gilbert dissenters pointed out, what the majority saw as reasonable
withholding of a one-sided benefit could equally be viewed as imposition
of a discriminatory burden.'4 6
2.

Round Two: The PDA Invalidates Sex-plus Analysis of
Pregnancy

The courts were seemingly prepared to labor on with the Gilbertand
Satty framework, amid growing criticism of their approach. 47 Congress spared them this endeavor. In 1978, Congress amended Title VII
with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, known as the "PDA."' 48 In so
doing, Congress explicitly rejected the Gilbert approach.149
In
Gilbert's place, the PDA gave Title VII a new definition section, which
states that discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related

142. See id. at 143-46.
143. Id. at 139.
144. Id. at 142.
145. Id.
146. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 147-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See supra note 135.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (defining "sex").
149. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670, 676 (1983).
But see id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). By implication, the Congress' rejection of Gilbert's
test suggests that it also rejected Sanly's analysis.
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medical conditions"' 50 is sex-based discrimination that violates Title
VII.
In relation to the difference analysis difficulties that had arisen
under Title VII, this new language did two things. First, it effectively
shifted pregnancy, childbirth, and "related medical conditions" from
categorization as neutral "plus" factors to categorization as discriminatory
"sex" factors. That is, an employer could no longer argue that a policy
directed at pregnancy or childbirth was a neutral policy that, under "sexplus" analysis, fell within the realm of permissible business judgments.
Under the PDA, "discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on
its face, discrimination because of her sex.''
Second, the PDA made
the gender uniqueness of pregnancy and childbirth non-determinative.
That is, the new section stated that "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment related purposes ...as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work."'5 Now, courts could use
the broader analytic category of ability or inability to work, rather than
choosing between benefits and burdens.
With the loss of a sex-plus argument strategy, employers could not
easily characterize their policies directed at biological sex differences as
neutral and nondiscriminatory. Similarly, they could not characterize
their polices as refusals to accord women a gender-specific benefit.
Instead, they had to turn to BFOQ analysis. That defense is "written
narrowly, and... read... narrowly."'5 3 Accordingly, reliance on the
BFOQ defense gives employers far less leeway than does sex-plus
analysis.
Difference analysis under the PDA is illustrated by the courts'
treatment of fetal protection policies that excluded fertile women, but not
men, from toxin-exposed jobs."
At first, the courts upheld such
policies under the PDA, but did so with wildly confused logic. For
example, the Eleventh Circuit had stated that "there is a 'presumption
that if the employer's policy by its terms applies only to women, then
the policy is facially discriminatory."" 5
The Eleventh Circuit

150.
151.
152.
153.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 462 U.S. at 684.
Id. at 671 n.1.
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).

154. UAW, 499 U.S. at 187; Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hasp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (1lth Cir.
1984), reh "g denied, 732 F.2d 944 (1984).
155. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 315 (E.D. Wisc. 1988) (quoting Hayes
v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (1lth Cir. 1984)).
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therefore "tend[ed] to agree [with plaintiffs] that this [was] ... facial
discrimination," but applied disparate impact theory "to ensure complete
fairness" to the defendant employer. 156 Once it got to disparate impact,
the court decided that the employer's policy was "neutral in the sense
that it effectively and equally protect[ed] the offspring of all employees."'157 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit "recognized that the facial
neutrality of a fetal protection policy 'might be subject to logical
dispute,"' but nonetheless felt that such a 'dispute would involve mere
semantic quibbling having no relevance to the underlying principle that
gave rise to this theory."" 5 8
Hence, the Fourth Circuit also used
disparate impact analysis, thereby implying that the policy was neutral.
What is significant about such logical contortions is that the PDA
made them necessary. Without the PDA, the courts could simply have
used sex-plus analysis to decide that fetal protection policies were not
directed at sex, but at a neutral characteristic. Then, the courts could
have proceeded to apply the Willingham II test. At that point, the courts
could have decided either that fertility and childbearing implicated
fundamental rights, or that fetal protection policies represented the
employer's judgment on how best to run its business."'
The PDA precluded this approach, so courts exchanged "sex-plus"
analysis for the questionable practice of treating a facially discriminatory
policy as a neutral one. On one level, this practice simply used disparate
impact concepts as a stand-in for sex-plus concepts. On another level,
the courts were struggling with the apparent 6 ' realities of difference.
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the problem boiled down to "the basic

156. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
157. Id.
158. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 884 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Wright v. Olin

Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 (4th Cir. 1982)).
159. See Willingham AI, 507 F.2d at 1091. Most likely, the courts would have invalidated at
least those policies involving toxins transmittable to the fetus by either parent. As the Supreme
Court observed, policies prompted by non-gender-specific toxins but directed only at women were

"conceptually similar" to Martin Marietta's exclusion of women with pre-school age children, but
not men.

UAW, 499 U.S. at 197. The courts might also have found that fertility implicates a

"fundamental right," or poses a Satty burden on women. In addition, the courts might have
considered fertility an "immutable" characteristic, even though women are fertile for only a portion-albeit a lengthy one-of their lives, and can use medical means to change their fertile
condition to one of infertility, or vice versa.

160. One problem with the courts' treatment of fetal protection policies was their assumption
that male employees' exposure to toxins would not harm their offspring. Much evidence suggests
that this is not the case. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant UAW, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S.
187 (1991) (No. 89-1215). Thus, the fetal protection cases involved both biological and stereotyped

differences.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
[Vol. 13:2

physical fact of human reproduction, that only women are capable of
Rather than confront the problem, the
bearing children."' 61
courts-and the EEOC---rationalized their approach by deciding that fetal
protection 'cases do not fit neatly into the traditional Title VII analytical
framework and, therefore, must be regarded as a class unto themselves."" 62
Perhaps recalling its Gilbert/Sattyfiasco, the Supreme Court refused
to adopt this approach. In UAW v. Johnson Controls,163 the Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision upholding a battery manufacturer's fetal protection policy.' 64 The Court flatly observed: "[tihe bias
in Johnson Controls' policy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile
women, are given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their
reproductive health for a particular job .... [Johnson Controls'] fetalprotection policy explicitly discriminates against women on the basis of
their sex.' 165 In approximately three printed pages, the Supreme Court
swiftly found disparate treatment where the lower courts had textually
agonized over a disparate impact based finding of no discrimination.16
The Court did so by finding fertile women and men alike in their
relationship to the question of reproductive risk; this premise allowed the
Court to treat the policy as sex-based discrimination rather than a "sex167
plus" business practice.
Having resolved the discrimination question, the Court proceeded to
the other side of the Title VII balance and considered whether Johnson
Controls' policy could be justified as a BFOQ.161 The answer was
no.169 Using an analysis that stressed the narrowness of the BFOQ
defense, the Court had "no70difficulty concluding that Johnson Controls
cannot establish a BFOQ."'

161. UAW, 886 F.2d at 886.
162. Id. at 885 (quoting EEOC Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title
VII, Oct. 3, 1988). The EEOC, like the courts, admitted that fetal protection policies were facially
discriminatory, and then proceeded to endorse analysis using the business necessity defense, which

was developed in disparate impact cases involving facially neutral policies. Id. at 885-86. Notably,
the business necessity defense offers employers more leeway than does the BFOQ defense, See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
163. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
164. Id. at 211.
165. Id. at 202.
166. Id. at 196-200; see also Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552-54 (two pages to dispose of issue);
Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182-92 (ten pages to dispose of issue).

167. UAW, 499 U.S. at 198.
168. Id. at 200-01.

169. Id. at 206.
170. Id.
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3.

Round Three: The Courts Return To Sex-plus Analysis

The PDA clarified difference analysis sufficiently to allow the
Supreme Court to find women-only fetal protection policies discriminatory; 1 however, other aspects of biological difference remained troublesome. For example, another piece of legislation was required to address
the fact that some employers' maternity leaves are of insufficient
duration to meet some women's needs.172 Similarly, the courts have
only just begun to address challenges to employment policies that deny
accommodations of pregnancy, and, therefore, require pregnant female
employees to conform to male norms. 73
The courts' approach to such cases tends to disfavor the female
plaintiffs. Following the PDA's terms, courts decline to find discrimination when the employer has treated all of its employees-pregnant or
not-in exactly the same way. 74 As Judge Posner colorfully put it:
as badly as they treat similarly
"[e]mployers can treat pregnant women
175
affected but nonpregnant employees."'
This treatment of pregnancy demonstrates that a literal reading of

the PDA may harbor pitfalls similar to those that arose with a literal,

"sex-plus" reading of Title VII. Tellingly, Judge Posner cites Satty to

171. UAW's analysis was based on the PDA. See 499 U.S. at 198-99.
172. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. V 1994). Of
course, the Act applies to both women and men. In so doing, it encourages all parents to participate
in the crucial bonding stages of infancy. Currently, almost all employees who invoke their leave
rights under the Act are women. See Louise Kieman, New Fathers Taking A Pass On Unpaid
PaternityLeave, CHi. TRiB., May 7, 1995, at C2.
173. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., Inc., 33 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 1994) (no violation
of PDA when employer discharged pregnant nurse who refused to treat AIDS patients); Troupe v.
May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (no discrimination when employer terminated
employee for excessive tardiness related to morning sickness); Elie v. K-Mart Corp., 64 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 957 (E.D. La. 1994) (no discrimination when employer terminated employee for
refusal of reassignment prompted by the employer's denial of pregnant employee's request to
remain at her position with assistance in lifting heavy items); Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846
F. Supp. 442 (D. Md. 1994) (defendant won summary judgment on plaintiff s claim that she was
demoted and constructively discharged for seeking an extended maternity leave to care for her
newborn's medical problems); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990),
aff'd without op., 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991) (no discrimination when employer terminated
female employee who desired extra maternity leave to wean her infant from breastfeeding).
174. See, e.g., Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1987) (reversing
district court's conclusion that employer had not discriminated when it put pregnant employee on
unpaid leave rather than provide assistance with lifting or pushing because plaintiff s "situation was
not exactly identical" to that of other employees with medical restrictions).
175. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
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support his contention that the PDA would be violated by an employer
who "overlooks the comparable absences of non-pregnant employees." '76 The proposition is true enough, but the Satty citation should
give us pause: it suggests a return to a pre-PDA search for benefits and
burdens, with all of its baffling inconsistencies.
For example, Judge Posner believes that the PDA does not mean
that employers must "take ... steps to make it ... as easy .. .[for
pregnant women to work] as it is for their spouses to continue working
during pregnancy.' 177 This statement seems to say that working
women with families must suffer burdens that working men with families
will never suffer. Under Satty, that "differential burden" situation
constitutes discrimination. Yet, Judge Posner upheld an employment
policy that imposes such differential burdens, because the PDA tells
employers to "ignore an employee's pregnancy,' ' 71 which means that
pregnant women are held to a non-pregnant "norm."
Similarly, Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co. 79 relied heavily on Gilbert
to reject the plaintiff's claim that her employer discriminated against her
when it discharged her from employment after she requested a six week
leave of absence to wean her six week old infant.'
In the court's
view, the plaintiff sought an accommodation of "child care concerns of
breast-feeding female workers by providing additional breast-feeding
leave not available to male workers."''
C.

Cultural Difference Cases

Title VII cultural difference cases fall primarily into two categories.
One category concerns employee grooming and dress practices related to
their ethnic and religious" 2 backgrounds. The other category concerns

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
789 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (holding that breastfeeding is not covered by the PDA).

180. Id. at 869.
181. Id. at 870; cf. Jirak v. Federal Express Corp., 805 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting
relief for a plaintiff discharged for absences allegedly related to back pain and menstrual cramps).
182. Strictly speaking, religious grooming cases are not necessarily cultural; however, most such
reported cases include a cultural component or flavor, either because the religion involved is

indigenous to a particular ethnic group, or because its grooming or dress strictures are designed to
set wearers apart from other religious or ethnic groups. Such religious grooming cases are analyzed

under Title VII's reasonable accommodations scheme, which applies only to religion. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1988) (defining religion); see, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382
(9th Cir. 1984); Isaac v. Butler's Shoe Corp., 511 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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on-the-job language restrictions. The latter category of cases represents
one of the least-discussed, but most troubling, applications of difference
analysis.
1. Grooming and Dress Cases
Cultural grooming cases are sparse, perhaps because the few suits
that have been brought have not succeeded.1 3 The courts generally
approach such cases using variations on sex-plus analysis. As a result,
"grooming codes are governed by decisional law that clearly lacks
conceptual coherence."'"
Courts that have considered cultural grooming cases usually apply
Willingham I's test to determine that the employer's policy is not
discriminatory.' 8 Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc. is the leading
example of this approach. Renee Rogers was an African American
airport operations agent for American Airlines. 6 American prohibited
some of its employees-including those in plaintiff's job-from wearing
"all-braided hairstyle[s]. ' ' , s7
Ms. Rogers challenged the policy on the grounds of sexual'88 and
racial discrimination!8 9 The racial challenge asserted that "the 'corn
row' style has a special significance for black women."' 190 The court
accepted Ms. Rogers' contentions regarding the cultural significance of
corn rows, but nonetheless found there was no discrimination. 9' First,
using sex-plus concepts, the court noted that the employer's policy
applied "equally to members of all races, and plaintiff [did] not allege
that an all-braided hair style is worn exclusively or even predominantly

183. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
184. Paulette M. Caldwell, A HairPiece:PerspectivesOn the Intersection Of Race and Gender,
1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 371 (1991).
185. See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding
employer's policy prohibiting an all-braided hairstyle); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair Empl.

Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
186. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.

187. Id.
188. Id. On the sex discrimination claim, she lost because the airline's policy was not sex

specific, and "[mI]any men have hair longer than many women. Some men have hair long enough
to wear in braids if they choose to do so." 1d. Moreover, even if the policy had not applied to both
sexes, it would have survived under Willingham H because hair styles are neither immutable nor a

fundamental right. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 232.
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by black people." 92 Second, plaintiff had apparently begun wearing
her braided hairstyle soon after it was "popularized" by a white actress

in a movie. 193 Third, returning to Willingham II's mutability test, the
court observed that "[a]n all-braided hair style is an 'easily changed
characteristic.""' 9 4
Interestingly, the court's consideration of the
mutability prong led it to suggest that the "natural" "Afro/bush" style
could not be banned because that would "implicate the policies
underlying the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of immutable
characteristics."' tg In contrast, the braided style was "a product of
artifice."' 96
Thus, the Willingham II test depends upon the hairstyle at issue,
even though both styles are culturally associated with race, and both
implicate the same questions. That is, an employer who forbids Afros
most likely would forbid cornrows for the same reason; likewise, an

employee who wishes to wear an Afro most likely would desire cornrows
for the same reason.

In both instances, employers' hair rules effectively require African
American women to adopt white norms."'

This implicit message' 98

behind no-braid rules has not escaped African American working women.
One television reporter who sued her employer for prohibiting her
cornrow style said she perceived the case as 'white male-dominated
management deciding how I should look as an acceptable black
woman."' 199 Indeed, many employers admit that they regard a non-

192. Id.
193. Id. The court did not explicitly state why this fact was determinative. Perhaps the court
felt that a hairstyle popularized by a white actress could not be culturally significant for African
Americans, although that conclusion would have contradicted the court's acceptance of plaintiffs
allegations regarding the style's significance. It is therefore likely that the court inferred that
plaintiffs selection of the hairstyle was inspired by the movie rather than her heritage.
194. Id. It is true that braids are a matter of choice, but "easily" seems an overstatement in
reference to the process of straightening. See LONNICE B. BONNER, GOOD HAIR-FOR COLORED
GIRLS WHO'VE CONSIDERED WEAVES WHEN THE CHEMICALS BECOME TOO RUFF (Crown Trade
Paperback ed. 1991). Apart from physical considerations, braids are not "easily" changed as a
philosophical matter. To the contrary, braids carry powerful connotations of ethnic pride and
identity. See Caldwell, supra note 184, at 365.
195. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
196. Id.
197. See Caldwell, supra note 184, at 372 n.15.
198. Dorothy Gilliam, PackagedHomogeneity ProducesA Skewed View, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
1981, at CI. Some employers may not consciously realize they are conveying this message. On
the other hand, it is interesting to note that advertising-when it portrays African American women,
at all--arely depicts braids. See Julia M. Bristor et al., Race and Ideology: African-American
Images In Television Advertising, 14 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 48, 55 (1995).
199. Gilliam, supra note 198, at Cl.
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ethnic, straightened hair style as "professional," and braids as unacceptable.200 Nor are cultural grooming issues restricted to women. African
American males may encounter policies that restrict their choice of
hairstyle.0 ' At least one Native American firefighter has asserted his
culture-based wish to wear long hair, despite his employer's safety-based
hair length rule. 2
The paucity of reported cases on the subject of cultural grooming
therefore belies the strength of feeling on both sides of the issue. In
recent years, employers' grooming strictures have begun to give way to
this force of feeling. In the late 1980's, the Marriot and Hyatt hotel
chains faced considerable negative publicity when they attempted to
enforce no-braid rules.0 3 Both employers backed down; Marriot did
so voluntarily, the Hyatt because of an EEOC ruling.0 4 In the summer
of 1995, Wendy's fast food chain avoided a public relations disaster by
reversing the no-braids judgment of one of its managers who would have
fired two young African American women working to save money for
college. 0 5
To the extent that Rogers and Willingham II now are being
interpreted to forbid repression of cultural difference, that shift suggests
that they were based on social tastes rather than the relatively static
categories of mutability and fundamental rights. Hairstyle can hardly be
mutable one day, and immutable the next. Nor can it be trivial one day,
and a fundamental right the next. Thus, it appears that Willingham II
and Rogers did not turn upon either concept. Instead, they turned upon
contemporary social tastes, filtered through the judges addressing the
cases.20 6 This dependency upon social norms means that Rogers and
the Willingham II test fail to respond consistently to what is really at

200. See Sheryl A. Barnett, BraidBias: Black Women Are FightingRules That Tell Them What
Hair Styles They Can Wear In The Workplace, NEwSDAY, Mar. 30, 1988, at 11-7.
201. See Jill Hodges, Indian FirefighterSees Long HairAs Heritage;Boss Sees It As Hazard,
STAR TarB., Mar. 26, 1992, at 1A (referring to prohibition of a black firefighter's four-parted

hairstyle).
202. See id. This firefighter seems unlikely to prevail, given Fitzpatrick's decision that

firefighters with PFB could not establish that a no-beard rule implemented to ensure respirator seals
violated Title VII. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (1 Ith Cir. 1993).
203. See Leah Y. Latimer, Union Assails Policies On Cornrows; Some Hotel Rules Said to
DiscriminateAgainstBlacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1988, at B3; Rudolph A. Pyatt, Jr., MarriotParts
Ways With Past Over A HairStyle, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 1988, at Fl; Jim Schachter, EEOC Says
Hyatt Showed Bias In Its Ban On Cornrows, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1988, at 4-1.
204. See Latimer, supra note 203, at B3; see also Pyatt, supra note 203, at Fl; Shachter, supra
note 203, at 4-1.
205. See Fast Food Workers Allowed to Wear Braids, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, at A20.
206. See generally Bartlett, supranote 100, at 2541.
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issue in cultural grooming cases.
2. Language Restriction Cases
Language inextricably relates to culture. 20 7 English-only rhetoric

concedes as much when it calls bilingualism a blow to American
culture's primacy.20 8 As so-called "culture wars" continue to brew,
language has become a flashpoint in the larger debate over immigration

policy and American culture. 0 9 Several states have passed Englishonly laws, which range from exhortatory declarations that English is the
state's "official language" to requirements that public employees use
only English in the workplace.2 10 In the private sector, recent court

207. See MARIO PEI, THE STORY OF LANGUAGE (rev. ed. Mentor Books 1965) (1949); EDWARD
SAPIR, Language, in CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY 1-44 (David G. Mandelbaum ed.,

Univ. Cal. Press 1949); Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules And The Right To Speak One's Primary
LanguageIn The Workplace, 23 J.L. Ref. 265, 276-87 (1990) (discussing language as a fundamental
and practically immutable aspect of ethnicity).
208. Recently, this rhetoric has grown particularly forceful. See Paul West, Anti-Immigrant
Rhetoric Heats Up Within the GOP, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 3, 1995, at IA.
209. See Julian Beltrame, English-only Movement On Rise: Flood Of ImmigrantsPrompts Bill
In U.S. Congress,THE GAZETTE (MONTREAL), Sept. 17, 1995, at B5. This controversy is closely
related to growing unease in some quarters at current rates of immigration. See Stephanie L. Kralik,
Civil Rights--The Scope of Title VII Protection For Employees Challenging English-Only
Rules---Garciav. Spun Steak Co., 67 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 393 & nnA-5 (1994). Economic strains
have produced fears that immigrants will "take jobs away from" citizens, or otherwise drain
economic resources; this unease is often deepened by the fact that the newest wave of immigrants
is largely non-European. See id.at 393 & nn.2-3; see also Beltrame, supra, at B5; Ralph Z. Hallow,
Buchanan Seeks To HaltImmigrationFor 5 Years, THE WASH. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at Al. Many
of these new immigrants do not speak English. See Aaron Epstein, 'English Only' Can Be Fighting
Words, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 5, 1994, at C4 (from 1980-1990, the Spanish-speaking U.S.
population increased 56%, and the Chinese-speaking population "more than doubled"). In fact,
assimilation pressures have always run strong in this country, particularly during periods of heavy
immigration or ethnic tension. See generallyBILL PIATT, LONLY ENGLISH?: LAW AND LANGUAGE

POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1990); Juan F. Perea, DemographyAnd Distrust: An Essay On
American Languages, CulturalPluralism,And Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1992); cf
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Diane Jennings, LinguisticDebateSets Tongues Afire; But
Experts Say Spanish To Stay Secondary In US., THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 22, 1993, at
IA, 6A (describing strong English-only sentiments---focused primarily on German speakers-during
and after World War 1).
210. See Henry Weinstein, U.S. Appeals Court Strikes Down Arizona's English-Only Law,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 8, 1994, at A14. The Ninth Circuit invalidated Arizona's law,
which mandated the use of English by state employees, on First Amendment grounds. Id. At the
time of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, eighteen states had English-only laws. Id. However, many such
laws are either symbolic, or have not yet been enforced. See Epstein, supra note 209, at C4 (citing
nineteen states with English-only laws). The Supreme Court will soon review the constitutionality
of such laws. See Yniguez v. Arizonans, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974).
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rulings apparently leave employers free to implement English-only

workplace rules."

Such rules appear to be gaining popularity amongst

employers,"' even though fears that English is being compromised or
eroded are probably unrealistic.2" 3

Indeed, "today's immigrants are learning English as fast or faster
than previous generations. 21 4 At least among Latino immigrants,
"more than [ninety-one] percent ...agree that U.S. residents should
learn English.""21

This consensus amongst immigrants reflects a

pragmatic recognition of the benefits of English in the job market,
particularly its effects on wages.216 At the same time, immigrants must
be concerned with "day-to-day" survival while they learn English.2 1
They also desire respect for their cultural heritage, and fear loss of that

211. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). Strictly speaking, Spun Steak
is not a clear green light for English-only rules. In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that it would
not defer to EEOC guidelines characterizing English-only rules as "per se" discrimination, see 998
F.2d at 1489-90, and found no grounds for the bilingual employees' claim that the English-only
policy had a disparate impact on them. Id. at 1484-88. Yet, the court left open the possibility of
a disparate impact claim for a monolingual employee, id. at 1488, as well as the possibility of a
discrimination claim based on a harassment theory "in some circumstances." Id. at 1489.
212. See PIATr, supra note 209, at 168 ("following the adoption of the California English-only
constitutional provision in 1986, a great many employers began enforcing English-only rules in the
workplace"); Kralik, supra note 209, at 394 & nn.6-7; see also Dan Clawson, Note, Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co.: The Ninth Circuit Requires That Title VII Plaintiffs Prove The Adverse Effect Of A
Challenged English-Only Workplace Rule, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 473, 473 & nn.l-2 (1994).
As of June 1994, approximately 120 complaints regarding English-only rules were pending with the
EEOC. At that time, the EEOC handled many such complaints by obtaining the employer's
agreement to rescind the rules; following Spun Steak, there is less-or no-incentive for an employer
to rescind an English-only policy. Complaints have arisen in such diverse settings as factories,
hospitals, stores, and the non-profit sector. See High Court Pressuredto Rule On English-Only
Worplaces (National Public Radio Broadcast, Mar. 11, 1994).
213. Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A. "[E]xperts say there is no threat that English will be
eclipsed by Spanish or any other tongue. In fact, studies show that immigrants from all nations
continue to learn English and that the language remains a common thread that binds America
together." Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A. For example, 78% of the 3.4 million Spanish-speaking
Texans "also speak English fluently." Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A.
214. Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A. By some expert estimates, "it takes three to five years
to master a language, and the original language usually is lost after three generations.... Today
language loss is beginning to occur in the second generation." Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A. At
the same time, there is much evidence that primary language serves as the most functional mode of
thought and communication, even after other languages are acquired. See Perea, supranote 209, at
279 (citing studies indicating the functional primacy of primary language).
215. Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A.
216. Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A.
217. Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A; see also Lena Sun, Some Immigrants Build Lives Without
English Cornerstone,WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1994, at Al.
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heritage in the face of pressures to assimilate.2 1 s
These multiple realities have sometimes collided with employers'
attitudes towards language.2 19 The collision came to a full head in
Garcia v. Gloor,' the leading early case on workplace language
policies." As with Willingham, the Fifth Circuit took two passes at
the case; this time, the court found for the employer on both occasions.'
Thus, the court found that Mr. Garcia's employer did not

violate Title VII when it discharged him for speaking Spanish at the
workplace.'
Ironically, Gloor originally hired Garcia because he was bilingual. 4 Gloor's business area was seventy-five percent Hispanic, and
many of its customers wanted to deal with Spanish-speaking salespeople. 5 Given these demographics, thirty-one of Gloor's thirty-nine

218. See Jennings, supra note 209, at 6A; see also IRVING HOWE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS
226-30, 271-78 (Touchstone Books 1976) (describing Jewish immigrant experience at turn of the
century).
219. Historically, employers have pragmatically approached language differences in the
workplace. Some employers have exploited non-English speaking immigrants. See Farhan Haq,
USA-Labor: Sweatshops A Growth Industry, INTER PRESS SERV., Sept. 18, 1995 (describing New
York sweatshops). Some employers permit linguistic diversity because they find it does not hamper
workplace efficiency, and may even help promote it. See High Court Pressured To Rule On
English-Only Workplaces (National Public Radio Broadcast, Mar. 11, 1994).
220. 609 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1980), withdrawn and substitutedby, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980),
cerr. denied., 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
221. At least two district courts had considered the issue before the Fifth Circuit's Gloor
decision. See Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (finding
discrimination when employer discharged a Mexican American employee for speaking two words
of Spanish while retaining a non-Hispanic employee who had assaulted the plaintiff); Mejia v. New
York Sheraton Hotel, 459 F. Supp. 375, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no discrimination when
employer refused a promotion based on plaintiffs poor English skills because her language
deficiencies rendered her unqualified for the job).
222. The first decision was issued in January 1980, authored by Judge Hatchett, and reported
at 609 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1980). Judge Rubin authored the second, May 1980 decision, which
withdrew and replaced the first. See 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). It is not clear what prompted
the Fifth Circuit's change in reasoning, as the second opinion was neither an en banc decision nor
a rehearing. Id. The second decision uses the first opinion's factual recitation and preliminary
legal remarks without any discernible alterations; however, its text departs from the court's original
effort once it turns to a discussion of the issues argued by the parties. Compare 609 F.2d at 158-60
with 618 F.2d at 266-68. At that point, the second decision reads largely like the first, but omits
passages tending to be especially dismissive of Garcia's claims, and substitutes passages that do
not entirely foreclose the idea that "[I]anguage may be used as a covert basis for national origin
discrimination." 618 F.2d at 268. The second decision also omits the original decision's
discussion of BFOQ and business necessity defenses. Compare 609 F.2d at 163-64 with 618 F.2d
at 271.
223. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266.
224. Id. at 269.
225. Id. at 267.
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employees were Hispanic, "and a Hispanic sat on the Board of Directors. 22 6 Yet, Gloor's English-only rule "prohibit[ed] employees from
speaking Spanish on the job unless they were communicating with
Spanish-speaking customers. ,,227
It did not apply to monolingual
employees, who all worked outdoors in the lumber yard, nor did it apply
during breaks.228
The employer offered several business reasons for its rule. First, the
store's English-speaking customers "objected to communications
between employees that they could not understand. 229 Second, trade
literature was in English, "so it was important for employees to be fluent
in English apart from conversations with English-speaking customers.""23
Third, the rule would improve employees' proficiency in
English. 231' Fourth, the rule would enable supervisors, all of whom did
not speak Spanish, to "better oversee the work of subordinates. 232 The
trial court found these four "valid business reasons" motivated Garcia's
discharge.233 This conclusion meant that the policy was directed at a
neutral factor, and not at national origin; otherwise, Gloor's proffered
reasons for its rule could 234
not have been "valid" absent a BFOQ or
analysis.
necessity
business
The lower court's factual reasoning is questionable. It found the
employer's policy free of discriminatory intent because it was supported
by business purposes.235 Yet, each of those purposes is suspect. To
begin with, customer preferences for English-speaking personnel likely
reflected the wishes of only twenty-five percent of the population
surrounding the store.2 6 As for the trade literature, the ability to read
English is irrelevant to a rule governing conversation; moreover, all of
the Spanish-speaking employees who might work with such literature

226. Id.
227. Id. at 266.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 267.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 266-67.
234. The employer's argument, as in Willingham, sounds like a BFOQ defense; however, the
court concluded that the rule was not even discriminatory.
235. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267.
236. Of course, the store's percentages of English and non-English speaking customers may
have varied from the surrounding population's percentages. Yet, most of the store's customer's
must have been Spanish-speaking, given the composition of its sales staff (seven of the eight spoke
Spanish), and the fact that Gloor found Garcia's bilingualism attractive when was hired. Gloor,
618 F.2d at 267.
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were bilingual. 37 Their bilingualism arguably obviated any forced
"English improvement"; in any event, the same reasoning did not prompt

Gloor to force on its non-Spanish speaking supervisors the primary
language of most of Gloor's customers and non-supervisory employ238
ees.

Be that as it may, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
the employer's reasons for its policy were factual conclusions; under the
clearly erroneous standard, such credibility findings are unlikely to be
reversed. What the Fifth Circuit could have reversed, but did not, was

the lower court's legal conclusion that a policy directed at language was
not a policy directed at national origin. Instead, the Fifth Circuit
declared that "[n]either the statute nor common understanding equates
national origin with the language that one chooses to speak. 239 With
this conclusion, the court restrictively defined Title VII's reference to

"national origin," much as it had done with "sex" in its earlier sex-plus

cases.
In fact, the court followed Willingham II to reach its result.24 It
viewed the defendant's language restriction as an arbitrary rule, which
"'
Title VII permitted so long as it did not discriminate.24

As for

determining what was discrimination, the court used the Willingham I

test, which identified Title VII violations as "discriminations... either
beyond the victim's power to alter,... or that impose a burden on an
employee on one of the prohibited bases. 242 Under this test, the Fifth

237. See id. at 266 (all monolingual employees worked in the lumber yard).
238. The facts suggest a workplace with an ethnic hierarchy. The lowest level employees, who
worked in the outdoor lumberyard, spoke only Spanish. The salespeople were almost all bilingual.
All supervisory personnel spoke only English. See id. at 266-67. While the composition of the
lower end of the hierarchy is not entirely surprising--non-English speakers frequently are weak
competitors in the job market---it is surprising that the bilingual abilities so desirable for the
salespeople were not equally desirable in supervisory personnel. One wonders how Spanish-speaking
customers were supposed to have spoken with management if they had a complaint.
239. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268. The court softened this conclusion with dicta that conceded:
"l]anguage may be used as a covert basis for national origin discrimination ...." Id. This dicta
does not broaden the statute's reference to national origin to include language; however, its
concession that an employer might use language as a means of national origin discrimination tacitly
acknowledges a close link between language and national origin. Similarly, the court noted that
"[tihe refusal to hire applicants who cannot speak English might be discriminatory if the jobs they
seek can be performed without knowledge of the language." Id. at 269. In any event, the Fifth
Circuit found neither situation present in the Gloor facts.
240. Id. at 269.
241. Id. at 267.
242. Id. at 269. The latter "impose a burden" phrase seems to amalgamate Willingham IH's
"fundamental rights" prong with SatO's language of "burdens," even though Congress had by then
discredited Satoy with its enactment of the PDA. See also id. at 269 n.5.
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Circuit found-without explicitly stating why it did so--that language is
neither immutable nor a fundamental right. 243
The court stated five times, in as many pages, its conviction that
language cannot be equated with national origin. 2 4
Perhaps the
court's unease stemmed from its use of Willingham I's immutability
test, for it could not escape the problem that language is not mutable (at
least, not immediately so) for a monolingual employee.245 In its
discomfort, the court seemed to have recognized the inconsistency of an
analysis that could simultaneously find the same English-only rule a Title
VII violation and an acceptable business judgment, depending on whether
246
employees-of the same national origin-were mono- or bilingual.
Soon after Gloor, the EEOC issued guidelines that defined national
origin to include language. 24 7 This reading of Title VII's terms was
consciously broad, 48
and deemed wholesale English-only rules
presumptive violations of Title VII.249 In the EEOC's view, such rules
comprised "a burdensome term and condition of employment.' 250 This
burden accrued because
[p]rohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking
their primary language or the language they speak most comfortably,
disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis
of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation and intimidation based on national origin which could result
in a discriminatory working environment."'
Recognizing that English can also be a legitimate business requirement,
the EEOC acknowledged that policies that applied "only ...at certain

243. See id. at 269.
244. See id. at 268-72.

245. Id. at 270.
246. See id. This inconsistency is reminiscent of Rogers' view that Title VII prohibits rules
restricting Afros, but not rules restricting braids. Rogers, 527 F.Supp. at 231-33.
247. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting)
(discussing nexus between Gloor and EEOC guidelines); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1993) (defining
national origin discrimination to include "linguistic characteristics of a national origin group").
248. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 ("The Commission defines national origin discrimination broadly
249. Id. § 1606.7(a).
250. Id. With this language, even the EEOC seemed unable to shake itself loose of Satty's
concept of burdens as an indicator of discrimination.
251. Id. This conception of English-only rules as national origin discrimination followed the
contours of the Fifth Circuit's description of circumstances in which an English-only rule might
discriminate, but broadens them to include protection of bilingual employees. See Gloor, 618 F.2d
at 270.
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times" could be justified as a "business necessity." 252
The EEOC guidelines made Gloor's analysis untenable. In light of
the guidelines, courts that considered English-only policies had to
generate a new analysis of linguistic difference. 253 Much of this

renewed consideration of the issue occurred in the Ninth Circuit. Like
the Fifth Circuit's treatment of Willingham and sex-plus issues, the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of English-only rules wavered for several
years. This evolution culminated with Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 254 in
which the court rejected the approach embodied in the EEOC guidelines.255
The Ninth Circuit's earlier treatments of the issue were more
flexible. In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., the court recognized the
EEOC's guidelines.256 In Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast

252. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1993).
253. See, e.g., Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding a policy can be directed at accent only when accent "interferes materially with job
performance"); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), reh 'g en bane denied,
861 F.2d 1187, vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989) (following EEOC guidelines to find
likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that English-only rule was disparate impact discrimination); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing both Gloor and
the EEOC guideline to find employer's "limited, reasonable and business-related" English-only rule
did not discriminate against bilingual radio announcer); Carino v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents,
750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding employment decision based on employee's accent, which
did not interfere with ability to perform job, was not based on a legitimate justification); McNeil v.
Aguilos, 831 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing EEOC guideline in denial of employer's
summary judgment motion on claim that permitting co-workers to speak Tagalog violated nonTagalog speaking plaintiff's rights under Title VII); Cota v. Tucson Police Dep't, 783 F. Supp.
458 (D. Ariz. 1992) (employer's policy of requiring uncompensated use of bilingual skills did not
violate Title VII); cf.Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306 (D.P.R. 1992) (equal protection
analysis acknowledging association of language with national origin, and noting that language "has
immutable aspects"); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 800 F. Supp. 144 (D.N.J. 1992) (analyzing habeas corpus
claim based on jury's ethnic composition, and citing Gutierrez while noting close association
between language and ethnicity).
254. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), reh'g en bane denied, 13 F.3d 296 (1993).
255. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir 1993).
256. 813 F.2d at 1411. Jurado's acknowledgment of the EEOC guidelines was somewhat
grudging, as it followed a citation to Gloor. See id. In addition, the court disagreed with the
bilingual plaintiff's claim that his employer violated Title VII when it discharged him for breaking
the employer's English-only rules by using Spanish phrases in his radio broadcast. Id.
Nonetheless, the court impliedly recognized that there was at least some discriminatory flavor to
Jurado's claim when it stated that the employer's rule was "business related"; if the court had read
and applied Gloor strictly, it could have found an arbitrary English-only rule non-discriminatory
under Title VII. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269. Moreover, the court's specific reference to the
rule's limited and business-related nature tracked the EEOC's rationale for permitting employers
to implement limited English-only rules in some circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1993).
Finally, the Jurado case was complicated by its broadcasting context, one of the few areas in which
the courts have permitted customer preferences to operate as a BFOQ, in light of the ratings-driven
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Judicial Dist. County of Los Angeles,257 the Ninth Circuit virtually
endorsed the guidelines, and even seemed willing to exceed them. 8
The plaintiff in Gutierrez, a bilingual Hispanic-American deputy court
clerk for a Los Angeles Municipal Court, challenged her employer's rule
prohibiting "employees to speak any language other than English, except
'
when acting as translators."259
Among other things, the plaintiff argued
that the policy violated Title VII's prohibition against national origin
discrimination, and sought a preliminary injunction against her employer's enforcement of the rule.26
The defendant's arguments parroted Gloor.2 61 In particular, the
defendant argued mutability by suggesting that language for a bilingual
employee is merely a matter of preference. 262 As a business necessity
defense, the Municipal Court argued that its rule was necessary for its
supervisors to oversee employees.2 63 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments. It found "the prohibition on intraemployee communications in Spanish... sweeping in nature
[with] ...a direct effect on the general atmosphere and environment of
the workplace. Under these circumstances, ease of compliance has little
or no relevance."6' ' As for supervisory concerns, the Ninth Circuit felt
that the "best way to ensure that supervisors ...are performing this part
of their assigned tasks would be to employ Spanish-speaking supervi'
sors."265
The linguistic realities of a workplace with Spanish speaking
employees and clients likewise rendered the defendants' "Tower of
Babel" argument unpersuasive.2 66
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the rule was necessary
to preserve workplace harmony.267 The employer asserted that its nonSpanish speaking employees and supervisors feared that Spanish speaking

nature of the business. See Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,

475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
257. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), reh 'gen banc denied, 861 F.2d 1187, vacated as moot,

490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
258. Id. at 1039-40.

259. Id. at 1036. At first, the rule applied throughout the workday, but after nine months it was
modified to permit non-English conversations during breaks and lunch. Id.
260. Id.

261. See 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
262. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040.
263. Id. at 1043.

264. Id. at 1040-41.
265. Id. at 1042.
266. Id.

267. Id.
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employees could hide the substance of their conversations;' 68 as
supervisors' affidavits suggested, "the speaking of Spanish unnerve[d]"
English speaking employees.26 9 The court deemed such fears unfounded. 70 More importantly, the court noted that whatever calming effect
could be achieved by an English-only rule did not justify its discriminatory effect because "[e]xisting racial fears
or prejudices and their effects
27
cannot justify a racial classification.
Ultimately, the fears of English speaking co-workers co-opted the

Ninth Circuit's analysis of English-only rules. 72 In Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co., 273 the Ninth Circuit upheld an English-only policy applied
to Spanish-speaking line workers at a meat processing plant. 4
Twenty-four of the thirty-three workers spoke Spanish; all but two of
these Spanish-speaking employees were bilingual, with "varying degrees

of proficiency in English., 275 The employer implemented its Englishonly policy in response to "complaints that some workers were using

their bilingual capabilities to harass and insult other workers in a
language they could not understand.

276

The employer's reasons for

268. Id.
269. Id. at 1042 & n.15. At least one of the employees who complained about her colleagues'
use of Spanish was an African American woman. See Gutierrez, 861 F.2d at 1191 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). While there was a good deal of evidence regarding
the existence of such fears and sensitivities, see id., no one seems to have suggested that nondiscriminatory approaches such as mediation, diversity training, or Spanish language training for nonHispanic employees would have assuaged them.
270. Guiderrez, 838 F.2d at 1043 (finding that despite the allegations "there is simply no
probative evidence of the Spanish language being used to conceal the substance of conversations').
271. Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)). The court's observation states the
obvious: an employer certainly could not justify a refusal to hire African American employees
because its other employees are racists who would react negatively to a non-white co-worker. Cf.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975). But cf. Kern v.
Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upheld employer's Moslem faith BFOQ for helicopter pilots flying into Mecca because Arabian
law provided for beheading of non-Moslems caught flying there).
272. This shift was presaged by Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Medical Ctr., 775 F. Supp.
338 (C.D. Cal. 1991). In that case, the court upheld defendant's no-Tagalog policy, finding it did
not constitute intentional national origin discrimination against the Filipina plaintiff. Id. at 343-44.
The court deemed the rule a management decision that the bilingual plaintiff could easily observe.
Id.
273. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), reh 'g denied en banc, 13 F.3d 296 (1993).
274. Id. at 1490.
275. Id. at 1483.
276. Id. Two English-speaking workers complained. One was African American, and the other
was Chinese American. Id. However, Ms. Garcia traced the policy to a Spanish speaking worker's
complaint about a male co-worker's harassment. See High Court PressuredTo Rule On EnglishOnly Workplaces (National Public Radio Broadcast, Mar. 11, 1994).
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its policy were that the rule
would promote racial harmony in the workplace, ... would enhance
worker safety because some employees who did not understand Spanish
claimed that the use of Spanish distracted them while they were
operating machinery, and would enhance product quality because the
U.S.D.A. inspector in the plant spoke only English and thus could not
understand if a product-related concern was raised in Spanish.277
On these facts, the district court denied summary judgment for the
employer.2 7 It found the policy was discriminatory
and unjustified by
2 0
9
business necessity.27 The Ninth Circuit reversed. 1
The Spanish-speaking plaintiffs, following the EEOC guidelines,
argued that the policy "denie[d] them the ability to express their cultural
heritage on the job; ... denie[d] them a privilege of employment that is
enjoyed by monolingual speakers of English; and ...create[d] an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation."2' '
The Ninth
Circuit saw this argument as a contention that the employer burdened its
Spanish speaking employees with "harsher working conditions than the
general employee population.,, 28 Under the EEOC guidelines, this
claim should have been viable; however, the Ninth Circuit declined to
follow the EEOC's approach, and chose instead to follow Gloor.283
Like the Fifth Circuit in Gloor, the court perceived the plaintiffs'
complaint as a request for special privileges. 2' According to the Ninth
Circuit, "Title VII is concerned only with disparities in the treatment of
workers; it does not confer substantive privileges."28'5 The fact that
English speaking workers could speak their primary language on the job
did not change this analysis. In the court's eyes, the bilingual plaintiffs
were like their co-workers in their capacity to communicate in English
and converse on the job; thus, the employer's policy treated all like
employees alike.286 Using this approach, the court was willing to find
a disparate impact claim for a non-English speaking employee if the rule
277. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1483.
278. Id. at 1484.

279. Id. Thus, the district court analyzed the case in accordance with the EEOC guidelines for
English-only rules.
280. Id. at 1490.
281. Id. at 1486-87.
282. Id. at 1485.
283. Id. at 1489.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1487 (citing Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269).
286. Id.
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adversely affected her, but found her colleagues' claims a matter of
convenience rather than discrimination.2 87
The Ninth Circuit did not entirely reject the possibility that Spanish
speaking employees might have a Title VII claim based upon an Englishonly policy;288 however, its analysis precluded reading Title VII's
reference to national origin to include a prohibition against language
restrictions. With this narrow view of Title VII, the court had entirely
abandoned its Gutierrez approach,289 just as the Fifth Circuit abandoned
291
its Willingham 129 approach when it decided Willingham fl.
Thus, the dissenters from denial of rehearing en banc in Gutierrez
ultimately prevailed in Spun Steak."gz The Gutierrez dissenters argued
that the court's opinion gave "employees the nearly absolute right to
speak a language other than English." 93 The dissenters therefore
feared that the opinion would "exacerbate ethnic tensions and force
employers to establish separate supervisorial tracks for employees who
choose to speak another language during working hours. 294 The
Gutierrez majority had addressed such concerns, but the dissenters
deemed the majority's suggestion that supervisors speak Spanish a 'let
them eat cake' attitude." '95 These themes of privilege and conflict
carried the day in Spun Steak, trumping any claim that the English-only
rule was discriminatory under Title VII.

287. Id. at 1488. The court intimated that such an adverse effect was absent, partly because the
employee "stated in her deposition that she was not bothered by the rule because she preferred not
to make small talk on the job, but rather preferred to work in peace." Id. With this testimony, the
one worker who fit the court's conception of equality haplessly rendered herself "like" her English
speaking co-workers by disclaiming any desire to speak throughout an entire workday, day after day.
In so doing, she underscored her bilingual colleagues' appearance of privilege-seeking: unlike this
model employee who "preferred to work in peace," the plaintiffs wanted to engage in "small talk."
Id.
288. Id. at 1489.

289. The court justified its failure to follow Gutierrez by virtue of the fact that it had been
vacated as moot after the plaintiff employee left her job. Id. at 1487 n.1; see also Spun Steak, 13
F.3d at 301 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The validity of these
grounds for rejection of the precedent was arguable. Id.
290. 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973)
291. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).

292. Judge O'Scannlain, who authored the court's Spun Steak opinion, had dissented from
denial of rehearing en banc in Gutierrez. 861 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988).
293. Id.
294. Id.

295. Id. at 1194.
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II.

DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS AND THE EQUALITY DEBATE

The courts' repeated use of sex-plus concepts has generated two
themes that run throughout difference analysis: the theme of normcentered equality, and the theme of difference as privilege. The current
equality debate cannot satisfactorily respond to these themes because
each of the two schools of thought concedes at least one of them.
A.

The Themes Of Difference Analysis

1. The Theme of Norm-Centered Equality
With the phrase "norm-centered," I refer to measurement of
discrimination claims against an employer's treatment of dominant
groups. 2 ' That is, the courts think of discrimination as differentiated
treatment accorded to "like" persons. 97 Hence, their first analytic step
in a difference case is to determine whether the complaining employee
is "like" other employees, or is differently situated.298 If the court
finds the latter, the employer's policy of differentiated treatment will be
deemed a permissible business judgment, so long as the "difference" is
something other than race, sex, national origin, or religion, as such. 99
This analysis potentially excludes all difference-based claims from
Title VII's protective scope. The plaintiffs in such cases do not fit the
"like persons" paradigm;.. therefore, they appear to have no viable
claim that any differentiated treatment constitutes discrimination. As
Professor Cass Sunstein has put it, this approach adds up to a requirement that "blacks must be treated the same as whites to the extent that

296. See Finley, supra note 18, at 197; Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment:
Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 169 (1994)
(criticizing the equal treatment model); cf. D. Marvin Jones, No Time For Trumpets: Title VII,
Equality, And The Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2355 & n.165 (1994).
297. This vision of the meaning ofdiscrirnination is probably traceable to constitutional rhetoric,
which speaks of "similarly situated" persons. See RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 13, at
94 (describing courts confronted with "sex-plus" cases as "steeped in the logic of 'similarly
situated' doctrine").
298. See generally RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 13, at 94.
299. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 n.10 (1969) (Brown, J., dissenting)
("[off course, the 'plus' could not be one of the other statutory categories"); see also RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 13, at 81-82.
300. See Dolkart, supra note 296, at 169 (criticizing equal treatment model's failure to account
for "the real differences of women and minorities').
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they are the same as whites; women must be
treated the same as men to
301
the extent that they are the same as men."
From the start, difference analysis was grounded in this normcentered vision of equality. This was true even when plaintiffs prevailed.
For example, every decision in the Phillips litigation turned on the same
vision of equality; what was determinative was the particular court's
perception of Mrs. Phillips as differently, or similarly, situated from
Martin Marietta's male employees with young children.30 2
The
Supreme Court saw women and men as equally situated with respect to
work and pre-school age children, so it analyzed Martin Marietta's
policy as a case of different treatment of like persons. 03 At the same
time, the Court was willing to treat the policy as a BFOQ if women were
not like men with respect to their family obligations.3" Similarly, the
lower Phillips courts asked whether the employer treated like persons
differently. They reached a decision different from the Supreme Court's
only because they did not see women and
men as "like" when it came
30 5
children.
small
with
work
to balancing
In Alan Willingham's case, the "like qualifications/like treatment"
formulation of equality and discrimination no longer applied once the
Fifth Circuit decided that women and men were not "like" when it came
to social norms for hair length. 0 6 Thus, the Willingham II court
prefaced its finding of non-discrimination with the observation that the
employer's policy only affected long-haired men "vis a vis members of
their own sex., 3 07 Assuming that men ordinarily-and by preference-wear short hair, the court could only conclude that the policy was
a rational business judgment targeted only at some portion of "different"
men, rather than at men as a group. 0 8
Similar problems infected the courts' initial treatment of biological
difference in the disability benefits context. In those cases, the courts

301. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2423. Professor Sunstein goes on to state that the law deems
blacks and whites, and women and men, "almost always ... the same," except for three areas of
difference: reproduction, legally constructed differences not in dispute, or differences "closely
associated with past discrimination." Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2423.
302. See Phillips, 411 F.2d at 4.
303. Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1259-60.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Phillips, 411 F.2d at 4 (stressing "differences between the normal relationships
of working fathers and working mothers to their pre-school age children"); Phillips, 69 L.R.R.M.
at 2129 ("[t[he responsibilities of men and women with small children are not the same").
306. Willingham II, 507 F.2d at 1090-91.
307. See id. at 1089.
308. Id.
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focused on the reality that men and women have different disabilities,
some of which are sex specific. Given this reality and the norm-centered
nature of the courts' equality model, the courts saw employment policies
directed at pregnancy and childbearing as policies directed only towards
pregnant women, who were differently situated from the non-pregnant
male norm. With this approach, the courts were unwilling to find
discrimination unless women could show that a policy was unjustified
because it assumed difference when women in fact conformed to male
norms. If the policy merely accorded different treatment to differently
situated persons, it was an acceptable business judgment based on
workplace needs.
The PDA did not really solve this problem; instead, it traded
Geduldig's and Gilbert's fiction of "non-pregnant persons" for the
fiction that pregnant women are "like" men. Specifically, the PDA
prohibits differential treatment of pregnant employees so long as they do
not differ from others "in their ability or inability to work." 30 9 It is
true that pregnancy has nothing to do with a worker's intrinsic capacities
for a job. Yet, it is also true that pregnant women are not similarly
situated to men; in reality, their bodies reflect for a brief time the most
fundamental of sex differences. Despite this reality, the PDA conditions
equal treatment upon "likeness" to men; that is, Title
VII protects
310
pregnant women only if they conform to a male norm.
In the third major category of difference cases, involving cultural
difference, the distorting norms are those of the employer's culture, or
of the dominant culture served by the employer's business. In grooming
cases, the norm is a "professional appearance," which generally is
deemed to be one that conforms to white, non-ethnic standards. t1 In
language restriction cases, English speaking is the baseline from which
claims are measured, and employers may reasonably restrict deviations
from that norm. 312 From this norm-centered perspective, courts may
see non-English speakers as "a difficult and sensitive problem for those
around them who do not speak the language, ' 31 3 even though the same
could be said from the bilingual employees' perspective. Similarly,
courts may deem it unfair to ask English-speaking employees to speak

309. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).

310. See id.
311. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text; see also Caldwell, supranote 184, at 372

n.15, 380.
312. See Caldwell, supra note 184, at 380-81.
313. See Gutierrez, 861 F.2d at 1193.
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multiple languages, 3 4 but perfectly natural to ask the same of ethnic
employees. On a more abstract level, they may acknowledge the history
of language-based discrimination, but blame it on immigrants' unwillingness to "preserv[e] native tongues and dialects for private and family
occasions.""31 This view entirely ignores the possibility that majority
groups use language restrictions as a means of cultural and political
repression.3" 6
2.

The Theme Of Difference As Privilege

The theme of difference as privilege is a corollary to the theme of
norm-centered equality. Under the norm-centered perspective, difference
plaintiffs cannot establish that their differences merit protection under
Title VII, nor that employment policies directed at difference constitute
discrimination. From these premises, it follows that any request for relief
from a difference-directed policy reflects a desire to deviate from the
employer's norms.317 In turn, this desire is perceived as asking for
special, privileged treatment.
Like the theme of norm-centered equality, this theme of privilege
entered into difference analysis from the start. The Willingham trial
court took the plaintiff's claim to mean that "employers would be
powerless to prevent extremes in dress and behavior totally unacceptable
according to prevailing standards and customs recognized by society."318 This claim struck the court as a demand for "a ridiculous,
unwarranted encroachment on a fundamental right of employers. 3 19
314. See id. at 1194 (rejecting suggestion of using Spanish-speaking supervisors).
315. See id. at 1192-93.
316. See Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d at 298 & nn.2-3 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); see also ROBERT McCRuM ET AL, THE STORY OF ENGLISH 137-41, 163-93

(1986) (recounting British use of language repression in Ireland and Scotland); id. at 73-76
(describing political and economic dominance of French speakers in England after the Norman
conquest); Jim Yardley, In Cajun Country Residents Buy Bilingualism, THE SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBuNE, Sept. 17, 1995, at A-2 (describing "stigmatiz[ing]" and "humiliat[ing]" effects of Louisiana

law forbidding use of French on school grounds from 1921 to 1974).
317. "A difference 'discovered' is more aptly a statement of relationship, expressing one
person's deviation from an unstated norm assumed by the other." Martha Minow, Justice
Engendered, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at 303. Such deviation has complex psychological
aspects for both the employee and those around him or her. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN,

STIGMA (1963). Goftlnan argues that stigma, which results from deviations from social norms, can
preclude "full social acceptance." Id. at preface. The practical effect of Title VII difference analysis
largely fits Goffiamn's theory, by disqualifying from the workplace persons who "deviate" from the
dominant norm.
318. Willingham, 352 F. Supp. at 1020.
319. Id. at 1021.
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Thus, the court ruled for the employer rather than "coerce" it "to
conform their practices to the demands of those few who affect practices
which are alien to prevailing societal norms. 320
In biological difference cases, the courts are somewhat less shrill.
Nonetheless, the theme of privilege virtually drove the courts' pre-PDA

analysis.

Policies that failed to account for women's biological

difference were acceptable refusals to accord women special privileges
("benefits," in Gilbert's parlance), rather than discriminatory, unequal
treatment of women versus men ("burdens," in Satty's parlance).
In post-PDA cases, courts frequently return to the themes of the
early stereotyping cases.32' These courts have regarded pregnancy
accommodations as special treatment, exceeding what the norm
requires."m Thus, the Troupe decision suggested that the plaintiff
sought to use Title VII as "a warrant for favoritism."3 23 Similarly, the
Armstrong court repeatedly characterized plaintiff's claim as a bid for
"preferential treatment."324 Another court perceived a claim seeking six
months' maternity leave as an attempt "to dictate managerial decisions."3' In a still more emphatic vein, another court felt that an
accommodation requirement for pregnancy would "require the employer

to relinquish virtually all control over employees once they do become
pregnant." 326 Such statements suggest that the courts have returned to

320. Id.; see also Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 238 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(denoting grooming plaintiff's claim a "whim of style').
321. See e.g., Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
322. See id.
323. Id. at 738.
324. Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp. Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1314, 1316-17 (1lth Cir. 1994).
325. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 930 (4th Cir. 1988). The Barrashcourt went so far as
to suggest that "plaintiff had defined her own rules to govern her employment relationship, and she
conceded nothing to the employer's right." Id.
326. Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 693 (M.D. Fla. 1994). The
extremity of this statement is startling. In most cases-such as Ms. Troupe's, or Ms. Elie's-the
accommodation sought is relatively minimal. For example, Ms. Troupe had a very poor tardiness
record; however, it was related to morning sickness, which typically ends after the first trimester of
pregnancy. See Troupe, 20 F.3d at 734; MAYO CLINIC BOOK OF PREGNANCY & BABY'S FIRST
YEAR 131 (Robert V. Johnson ed., 1994) [hereinafter MAYO]. Ms. Elie wanted to avoid heavy
lifting beginning in her fifth month of pregnancy. See Elie v. K-Mart Corp., 64 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 957, 958-59 (E.D. La. 1994); MAYO, supra, at 22 (repetitive heavy lifting can "increase
the risk ofpreterm labor and low birth weight.). Thus, she would have required either "light duty,"
or assistance with "some" heavy lifting, for four months. As for Ms. Wallace, she wanted six
weeks' leave because her six week old infant refused a bottle; if her allegations were true, she
sought the "privilege" of ensuring that her baby would not starve. But see Wallace v. Pyro Mining
Co., No. 90-6259, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30157, at *3 (6th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff failed to prove
"medical necessity" of breastfeeding).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

45

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 13:2

Gilbert's notion that the uniqueness of pregnancy means that it should
not be acknowledged with "benefits" that men cannot enjoy.
The privilege theme is likewise apparent in language restriction
cases. Gloor and its progeny explicitly describe plaintiffs' claims as a
request for a privilege, even though "[a]n employer's failure to forbid
employees to speak English does not grant them a privilege. '3 27 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit characterized Garcia's claim as a contention that
others like to speak English on the job and do so without penalty.
Speaking Spanish is very important to me and is inherent in my
ancestral national origin. Therefore, I should be permitted to speak it
and the denial to me of that preference so important to my self-identity
is statutorily forbidden.328
The court found this contention absurd because "[n]o authority... gives
a person a right to speak any particular language at work ....
[I]f the
employer engages a bilingual person, that person is granted neither right
nor privilege by the statute to use the language of his personal prefer329
ence."
3.

The Effects Of The Twin Themes Of Difference Analysis

In the area of stereotyped difference, Willingham II tilted Title
VII's balance strongly towards employer interests, effectively conflating
a broadened BFOQ exception with a narrowed scope of Title VII
protection. Thus, Willingham II affirmed the district court's findings,
which Willingham I had branded "more pertinent to the bfoq defense
than the question whether there was discrimination, 33 and concluded
that "Macon Telegraph's dress and grooming policy does not unlawfully
discriminate on the basis of sex, [so that] the applicability of the
B.F.O.Q. exception [need] not be considered. 3 31
In so doing,
Willingham 1I transformed a BFOQ analysis into a non-discrimination
analysis, tailored to the narrowest possible reading of the statute and
then-governing precedent.
Narrowed readings of Title VII's protected categories, and a

327. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269. Of course, this statement only makes sense from a norm-centered
perspective.
328. Id. at 271.
329. Id. at 268-69.
330. Willingham 1, 482 F.2d at 538.
331. Willingham 11, 507 F.2d at 1088.
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skewed tilt to employer interests, have pervaded the other two areas of
difference analysis. Using the themes of norm-centered equality and
difference as privilege, the courts were unable or unwilling to link
biological difference with "sex," or cultural difference with "race" or
"national origin." As a result, difference is excluded from Title VIl's
protective sweep.332
In this manner, current difference analysis enforces what Lucinda
Finley calls "the American ideal of homogeneous equality," which
actually extends only to those who fit the homogenized ideal. 333 This
ideal has "legitimated ... invidious discrimination," because "everything
that is dissimilar from [that] standard [is] the deviate 'other.' ' 334 As
Professor Finley concludes: "[d]ifference is stigmatizing because the
assimilationist ideal 335
underlying our society's conception of equality
sameness.
presumes
B.

The Equality Debate's Response To Difference Analysis Themes

Rich as the equality debate has been, it has not truly responded to
the themes of difference analysis. One school of thought in the debate
buys into the theme of norm-centered equality. The other school of
thought plays into the hands of the theme of difference as privilege.
Moreover, neither school addresses all of the varieties of difference
analysis, focusing nearly exclusively on biological differences between
men and women.
1. Buying Into Norm-Centered Equality
Proponents of the "equal treatment" conception of equality advocate
an approach that effectively "buys into" the theme of norm-centered
equality,33 6 as the early fetal protection and the now-growing body, of
post-PDA cases suggest. In these cases, the courts applied the equal

332. Pre-Title VII legal exclusion of "different" persons from the workplace perpetuated a
business culture suited to the workers then at hand: white males. Title VII prompted the inclusion
of non-whites and non-males in the workplace, but did nothing to prompt changes in the context to
which these new workers were now admitted. See generallyFEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION,
GOOD FOR BUSINEss: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL (1995). This reality means
that workers who differ from workplace norms cannot challenge employer policies directed at forcing

conformance to those norms.
333. Finley, supra note 18, at 197.
334. Finley, supra note 18, at 197.

335. Finley, supra note 18, at 197; see also Caldwell, supra note 184, at 380.
336. See generally Troupe, 20 F.3d at 734.
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treatment model and assumed that pregnant women are entitled to the
337
same treatment as men so long as they are similarly situated to men.
This standard means that pregnant women are held to non-pregnant, male
norms. Hence, differences related to fetal safety, morning sickness,
lifting and standing restrictions, excess fatigue, and breastfeeding are all
deemed fair grounds for disadvantageous treatment, or discharge from
employment.338
Doubtless, at least some of these results are not what equal
treatment theorists had in mind. To the contrary, these commentators
have sought "laws and rules that make no assumptions about the sex of
the family childrearer or wage earner, but simply address those functions
directly."339 Such laws, in turn, would spur a restructured, gender
neutral workplace. 340 In pursuit of this vision, equal treatment theorists
have rejected sex specific accommodations of difference, so as to avoid
labeling issues such as child care "women's problems. ' 34 1 This hope
has not been borne out because the equal treatment model incorporates
the like person/equal treatment form of analysis that underlies the theme
of norm-centered equality. While equal treatment theorists attempt to
avoid this trap by reference to an "androgynous," rather than a male,
norm, 342 the courts have not taken this cue. If anything, they have
retrenched their male oriented, norm-centered analysis.
The equal treatment theorists have been unable to prevent this result
because their equality model is only as sensitive as its user. Thus, a
judge using an androgynous norm would deem women and men similarly
situated with respect to reproduction and childrearing. At the same time,
a judge using a male norm would deem women and men differently
situated because women can and do become pregnant, breastfeed, and
carry greater childrearing burdens 34 3 than do men.
The equal treatment model generates similar analytic twists and
turns for all kinds of difference. A neutral judge would deem women
and men similarly situated in their capacity to present a professional

337. Id. at 738.

338. See Armstrong, 33 F.3d at 1314-17.
339. Williams, supra note 19, at 143.
340. Williams, supra note 19, at 143-44.
341. Williams, supra note 19, at 144.
342. Williams, supra note 19, at 151.
343. This is especially true given current demographic shifts towards single parent, femaleheaded households. See Linda J. Krieger and Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy, in

FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at 165 (equal treatment model works well for women who can
conform to the male norm, but not for "women who deviate substantially from the male norm,
specifically working class and single mothers").
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workplace appearance; a norm-centered judge would deem them
differently situated with respect to suitable modes of dress and hairstyle.3" A neutral judge would deem English and non-English languages similar in their communicative capacities, while a norm-centered
judge would differentiate English from other languages.
3 45
The equal treatment model is inherently subject to such shifts,
which characterize the turns taken by the Fifth Circuit between
Willingham land Willingham I. The difference between the lower court
and Supreme Court Phillips decisions is likewise traceable to such a
shift. Contrasted with Geduldig, Gilbert, and Satty, the PDA represents
the same kind of shift; moreover, the shifting process repeated itself yet
again in early fetal protection, and later post-PDA, cases. The same can
also be said for Gloor, Gutierrez, and Spun Steak.
Proposed modifications to the equal treatment approach to provide
short term accommodations3 46 of pregnancy implicitly acknowledge this
problem, but do not really solve it. To begin with, this approach leaves
stereotyped and cultural difference cases untouched. That problem aside,
the argument that men and women are similarly situated but for limited,
"episodic" phases of pregnancy3 47 has much initial appeal, because it
seems to answer cases, such as Troupe, that involve quite limited
accommodations to pregnancy. Yet, outside such circumstances, it
retains the PDA's flaws: it asks women to minimize pregnancy and
childbearing functions, so as to be as much like men as possible. 34 8 To
the extent that this model avoids such a "superwoman" syndrome,
it-like the special treatment model-falls into the analytic traps set by
the theme of difference as privilege.
2. Special Treatment And Privilege
Like the equal treatment advocates, special treatment theorists

344. See generally Bartlett, supra note 100.
345. See Martha Minow, JusticeEngendered, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 14, at 303.
346. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 20, at 28-30, 32-38.
347. Kay, supra note 20, at 22-26.
348. Kay, supra note 20, at 34 (positing a "bright line between pregnancy and child care"
because "the woman's reproductive cycle ends with childbirth"). With this bright line approach,
the result is the same for the plaintiff in Wallace. See Kay, supranote 20, at 35 n.174. In that case,

plaintiff's problem arose six weeks after childbirth, when her maternity leave was up but her baby
refused bottles and could only be fed by nursing. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867,
868 (W.D. Ky. 1990). In this situation-on the "like men" side of Professor Kay's bright line--the
plaintiff was in a position that no male would ever experience: if she worked, the baby would not

eat; if the baby ate, she lost her job.
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largely address only sex-based biological differences. Within that sector
of difference analysis, special treatment advocates avoid the normcentered theme, but fall prey to the privilege theme. Indeed, the special
349
treatment model has been much-criticized on these very grounds.
Aside from the apparent theoretical inconsistency of an argument
that equality requires differential treatment, the model's practical
effectiveness is limited by its failure to justify tangibly the costs of
accommodation.
Special treatment advocates-and even episodic
analysis advocates-justify the costs of special treatment on abstract
grounds; namely, they resort to appeals to the "social value" of
workplace equality and the fundamental right status of procreative
activity.'
I do not disagree for a moment with this assessment of
social values, but the argument's abstractness renders it precarious in
light of emerging judicial deference to cost-based employer arguments.35 '
In short, the courts appear unwilling to dismiss costs from their
analysis of the employer interest side of Title VII's balance, but the
special treatment theorists sound as though Title VII need only concern
itself with employee interests. On this point, the special treatment
argument is mistaken. Title VII's paramount goal is elimination of
employment discrimination, but it also preserves employers' traditional
prerogatives. 2 Courts are unlikely to discard this principle, which is
grounded in the Act's language and structure.353
C.

New Themes Of Difference: Equality of OpportunityAnd A
Balance of Interests

In a sense, the two sides of the equality debate talk past each other.
"Choosing the equal treatment approach undermines the equal opportuni-

349. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 19, at 192-93 (describing critique of the special treatment
position).
350. See Kay, supra note 20, at 27-28. This pair of values closely echoes Willinghan II's
categories of mutability and fundamental rights.

351. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (1993) (finding employer could
discharge employee to avoid pension costs without violating ADEA because pensions are analytically
distinct from age); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 223-24 (1991) (Scalia, J.,

concurring); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (costs are relevant to
less discriminatory alternative analysis in disparate impact cases).
352. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998; Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1994).
353. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text.
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ty value, and choosing that value undermines the equal treatment
ideal. ' 3 s Even as each side replays one of the two difference analysis
themes, both sides have tended to ignore the full dimensions of
difference. Thus, the debate ignores the full problem and its solution,
settling instead for infinite repetitions of, and variations on, their initial
positions.
To break out of this cycle, the themes of norm-centered equality and
difference as privilege must be replaced with themes that restore Title
VII's commitment to equality of opportunity and balance between
employer and employee interests. Such themes are exemplified by the
law's treatment of workplace difference outside of Title VI. 5 5 Under
the ADA and § 504, claims for accommodations to difference are
denoted discrimination claims, and not claims for privileged treatment.356 Thus, difference in the form of disability will be "reasonably
accommodated" if the employee is "qualified" for the job and the
accommodation will not pose an "undue hardship" on the employer.357
The disabilities that trigger such accommodations encompass more
than the employee's current, actual physical state. A "record of
impairment," or a showing that an employee is "regarded as having an
impairment," will also trigger ADA and § 504 protections. 358 These
expansive definitions address "Congress' concern with protecting the
handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple
prejudice, but also from 'archaic attitudes and laws' and from 'the fact
that the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to
the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps.""'3 9
Between their accommodation provisions and their definitions of

354. Finley, supra note 18, at 196.
355. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2428 (using disability analogies to critique difference

analysis under Title VII).
356. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (Supp. V 1994) (meaning of "discrimination" under theADA);
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988) (discrimination under § 504). But see Daniel Seligman & Patty de Llosa,
The ADA Gravy Train, FORTUNE, June 28, 1993, at 150 (reflecting a sense in some quarters that

accommodation claims are claims for special privileges, rather than claims for nondiscriminatory
treatment).
357. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), (9), (10) (Supp V. 1994) (defining "qualified individual with
a disability," "reasonable accommodation," and "undue hardship" under the ADA); see also id.
§ 12112(b)(5)(a) (incorporating refusal of reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship into

prohibition of employment discrimination).
358. See School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278 (1987) (quoting

§ 504's statutory definitions for "handicapped individual"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (Supp. V
1993) (defining "disability" under the ADA).

359. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (citing legislative history of § 504); see also id. at 284 (society's
myths and fears about disabilities are as handicapping as actual impairment).
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disability and handicap, the ADA and section 504 address the problem
of deciding whether policies directed at characteristics associatedwith a
disability are discriminatory. For example, the Supreme Court rejected
an employer's claim that a policy directed at "the contagious effects" of
tuberculosis "can be meaningfully distinguished from the disease's
physical effects on a claimant." 3 0 The Court rejected this argument
because
contagiousness and... physical impairment each resulted from the
same underlying condition, tuberculosis. It would be unfair to allow an
employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of a disease
on others and the effects of a disease on 361
a patient and use that
distinction to justify discriminatory treatment.
The fact that difference analysis succeeds under the ADA and
section 504 where it fails under Title VII has important consequences for
the reconceptualization of difference analysis under the latter statute.
Unlike Title VII jurisprudence, the ADA and section 504 reflect a
difference-oriented conception of equality focused on opportunity, rather
than a norm-centered conception of equality that sees difference as an
unfair privilege. Ironically, this idea of difference-oriented equality of
opportunity emerged in the Supreme Court's first encounter with Title
VII. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court described Title VII's
underlying principles as something more than
equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk
to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required
that the posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account.
It has... provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be
one all seekers can use.362
Title VII difference analysis has forgotten this principle, and puts

360. Id. at 282. Contrast this statement with the Court's decision in Hazen, which stated that

avoidance of pension costs was an employment decision based on factors "analytically distinct" from
age. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1707 (1993). Hazen's approach is
significant for Title VII jurisprudence because the ADEA's substantive language is derived from

Title VII. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
361. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282.

362. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Court's reference to the stork and fox alludes to one of
Aesop's fables. The story highlights the effect of difference: the fox serves the stork a drink in
a shallow dish, which is useless to the stork; the stork retaliates by serving the fox with a tall,
narrow jar, which is useless to the fox. See The Fox and the Stork, in HESITANT WOLF AND
ScRuPuLoUs Fox: FABLES SELECTED FROM WORLD LITERATURE 163 (Karen Kennerly ed., 1973).
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employees in the position of the fox confronting the tall milk vessel: the
employee can do the job, but is deprived of the opportunity by the
employer's norm-centered rule.
IV.

RECONCEPTUALIZING DIFFERENCE

The Deaf comprise the one group that is simultaneously disabled
and culturally different. Not only do the deaf straddle the worlds of
disability and cultural difference, but they also provide a human analog
to the story of the fox and the stork. In the fable, the fox would be able
to drink if only he could perform the act of drinking in the way that
worked best for him. Unfortunately for the fox, the vessel was shaped
to a long-billed stork "norm," shutting the fox out of opportunity based
on his difference. Unable to hear or speak as the non-deaf do, the deaf
occupy the position of the fox: they can communicate, but they are cut
off from maximum effectiveness, and opportunity, when they are
confined to modes of communication designed for hearing norms.
A. Lessons From Deaf Culture
The general public first became aware of the Deaf culture movement
in 1988, during the Gallaudet University3 63 student protest.' 64 Since
then, a spate of books and articles,3 65 and elements of popular culture,3" have kept the idea of Deaf culture in the general public's
consciousness.
363. Gallaudet University is "the world's only Deaf university." Solomon, supra note 27, at
41. It was established as a federally chartered college for the deaf in 1864. See HARLAN LANE, THE
MASK OF BENEVOLENCE 165 (1992); ScHI-tN, supra note 27, at 137. The National Technical

Institute for the Deaf [hereinafter NTID] was opened "as a second college for the deaf in 1968."
ARDEN NEISSER, THE OTHER SIDE OF SILENCE 52 (1983).

364. The week-long protest occurred in March 1988, when Gallaudet alumni and students angrily
reacted to the University Board of Trustees' selection of a hearing president. From its inception,
all of Gallaudet's presidents were hearing. See LANE, supra note 363, at 187. Following a week
of student protest and intensive media coverage, the new hearing president resigned, and the Board
selected a deaf man, I. King Jordan, as the University's next president. See LANE, supra note 363,

at 189-91.
365. See, e.g., LEAH H. COHEN, TRAIN Go SORRY (1994); OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES
(1989); Edward Dolnick, DeafnessAs Culture, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1993, at 37; Solomon, supra
note 27, at 40.

366. In 1987, deaf actress Marlee Matlin won the Best Actress Oscar for her performance in
Children of a Lesser God; in 1994, Heather Whitestone, who is 95% deaf, won the "Miss America"
pageant. See Ellen Grehan, Traitor; Why They've Turned On Miss America, SUNDAY MAIL, Apr.
2, 1995, at 13. Whitestone's selection excited many deaf Americans; however, her reliance on oral

communication methods is controversial in the Deaf community. See id.
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The roots of Deaf culture go far deeper than these recent events.
While Deaf culture stems from multiple sources, its predominant feature
is its language.3 67 More specifically, the modem Deaf culture argument

is most deeply rooted in the existence and nature of American Sign
Language ("ASL").368

The lessons of Deaf culture for difference

analysis lie largely in its linguistic roots, for ASL deviates from "normal"
communication modes, yet maximizes the communicative effectiveness
3 69
of its users.

1. The Linguistic Roots of Deaf Culture
ASL's history has long been known,370 but its nature as an
independent language was only recently recognized. Until the 1960's,
ASL was widely regarded as an iconic mode of pidgin-English, with
limited capacities for abstraction and expression.37' Such misconceptions (still extant in some quarters) were proved false in 1960, when

William Stokoe, a non-deaf Gallaudet University professor with a

367. Deaf culture is a complex entity, stemming from, among other things, use of American Sign
Language, myriad deaf organizations, social clubs, deaf-published newspapers, and deaf residential
schools. See generally PADDEN & HuMPHRIES, supra note 27.
368. American Sign Language has been described as 'the natural language of the deaf."'
Dolnick, supra note 365, at 40. There are many other manual communication systems, including
"cued speech" (limited number of handshapes and positions indicate consonants and sounds
otherwise indistinguishable to lip readers), various manual English systems (representations of
spoken English), fingerspelling (handshapes denote each letter of the alphabet), and "home signs"
(idiosyncratic systems developed by individual deafpersons not exposed to other manual languages).
See generally JEROME D. SCHEIN, SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE OF SIGN 5-6, 33, 64-100 (1984).
Moreover, the deaf in other countries have their own sign languages, see SCHEIN, supra note 27, at
27, and ASL-like spoken American English-has different regional dialects. See Solomon, supra
note 27, at 44-45. In America, ASL is unique among manual communication systems: it is a
language with its own syntax and grammar, independent of English. See NEISSER, supra note 363,
at 46-49.
369. See infra notes 370-93 and accompanying text.
370. ASL's origins are partially traceable to a visual communication system formalized in
eighteenth-century France by the Abbe de l'Epee, a teacher of the deaf. This system was brought
to America by Laurent Clerc, a deaf man hired by Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet to teach at the
Hartford School for the Deaf. There, the French sign language merged with existing American
usages and evolved into modem-day ASL much as any other language evolves over time. See
SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 54-59.
371. See LANE, supra note 363, at 45-46 (describing hearing attitudes towards sign language);
NEISSER, supra note 363, at 48 (explaining how "ASL was thought to be a language without nouns
and verbs ....
It was thought to have no inflections (tenses) on the verb .... "); PADDEN &
HUMPHRIES, supra note 27, at 7 (stating that ASL commonly misconceived as "either a collection
of individual gestures or a code on the hands for spoken English"); SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 2
(describing how "[ift was considered ...to be a substitute for spoken English-and a poor substitute
at that .... ").
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linguistics background, studied ASL and concluded that it is a complete,
unique language with its own syntax and grammar. 72
Stokoe's "discovery" was controversial, even at Gallaudet.373 On
one level, Stokoe simply confirmed through scholarship what the deaf
knew through experience: ASL "is a natural language."3 74 Deaf ASL
users "think in it, have internal monologues in it, dream in it.",37 5 ASL
is so used because, like the words of any independent language, "[t]he
signs of ASL refer directly to meaning rather than to a specific English
word. 376 Stokoe had merely identified and described ASL's means
Yet, Stokoe's work had significant political
of signification. 37
implications because it challenged the core premises of hearing attitudes
towards the deaf, as well as the entire system of deaf education.
37
Until 1880, sign language was widely used in deaf education. 1
In that year, a conference of 164 hearing educators of the deaf convened
in Milan, Italy. 379 At the conference, the delegates affirmed resolutions
endorsing "'the incontestible superiority of speech,"' and, therefore, oral
methods in deaf education. 38" The delegates did so without consulting
the wishes of the deaf; to the contrary, deaf educators were excluded
from the convention.38'
The impact of the Milan Congress and the oralism movement it
spearheaded was profound.
In 1882... only 7.5[%] of the 7,000 pupils in American schools for
deaf

children were

taught

orally

(that is,

without

signs

or

fingerspelling). By 1900 that percentage had increased to 47. The year

372. See PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 27, at 79-80 (describing Stokoe's analysis and its

impact); SACKS, supra note 365, at 76-77 (same); JOSEPH SHAPIRO, No PITY 97-98 (1st paperback
ed. 1994). For a detailed description of Stokoe's system of analysis of ASL's structure, see
SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 10-21.

373. See NEISSER, supra note 363, at 46; PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 27, at 79-80.
374. NEISSER, supra note 363, at 47.
375. NEISSER, supra note 363, at 47.
376. NEISSER, supra note 363, at 47.
377. See supra note 372.
378. See LANE, supra note 363, at 113.
379. LANE, supra note 363, at 113-14.
380. LANE, supra note 363, at 114-15. Specifically, all but six delegates (five of whom
comprised the American delegation) voted to adopt this motion: "'[t]he Convention, considering the
incontestable superiority of speech over signs, (1) for restoring deaf-mutes to social life, and (2) for
giving them greater facility of language, declares that the method of articulation should have the
preference over that of signs in the instruction and education of the deaf and dumb."' JOHN
VICKERY VAN CLEVE & BARRY CROUCH, A PLACE OF THEIR OWN 110 (1989) (quoting Edward M.
Gallaudet, The Milan Convention, in 26 AMERICAN ANNALS OF THE DEAF 4, 5-6 (Jan. 1981)).

381. See LANE, supra note 363, at 113.
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1905 marked a watershed-for the first time in American history the
majority of deaf students learned without [sign].
Speech,
speechreading, and writing, rather than sign language and the manual
alphabet, were the communication methods used to instruct the majority
of deaf pupils in the United States. By 1919, at the peak of oralism's
influence, schools reported that nearly 80 percent of deaf students
received their instruction
and communicated with their teachers without
382
any manual language.
The Deaf community rejected the new stress on oralism, 38 3 and
oral/manual debates have roiled the world of deaf education ever
since.3 84

Deaf activists "worked against attempts to eliminate manual
communication from deaf schools. '3 5 Such activists "argued that
speech reading involved merely substituting one form of visual communication that was reliable for another that was less so because 'to the
deaf, speech is but another mode of signs, and a very poor and indistinct
one as compared with any of the other methods.' 386 Within the Deaf
community, protests against oralism were impassioned. 7 The first
National Association of the Deaf ("NAD") President asked: .'[w]hat
heinous crime have the deaf been guilty of that their language should be
proscribed?' 388 According to the Deaf press, "oralism [was] the
method of 'violence, oppression, obscurantism, charlatanism, which only
makes idiots of the poor deaf-mute children."' 3 89
The proponents of oralism were equally impassioned.
Bell argued that sign language made deaf Americans different from
their hearing peers; he insisted that it encouraged the growth of a deaf
culture and that it perpetuated negative genetic traits. Hearing parents
objected to sign language because they believed its use prevented their
children from practicing speech and thus being 'normal.' Politicians
382. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 122.
383. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 132.
384. Not only have these debates been long lasting, but they are still ongoing. See James
Woodward, Some SociolinguisticProblems in the Implementation of BilingualEducationfor Deaf
Students, in How You GONNA GET To HEAVEN IF YOU CAN'T TALK WITH JESUS 21-37 (James
Woodward ed., 1982) [hereinafter HEAVEN]; see generally COHEN, supra note 365, at 120-25.
385. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 132.

386. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supranote 380, at 134 (quoting deaf activist Olof Hanson's letter
to oralism proponent Alexander Graham Bell, unsuccessfully requesting Bell's support for a statute

adding manual alphabet training to the deaf education curriculum in Illinois).
387. See LANE, supra note 363, at 117.
388. LANE, supra note 363, at 117.
389. LANE, supra note 363, at 117.
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thought that instruction by means of sign language made deaf education
needlessly expensive. Hearing teachers and their professional associa-

tions argued that signs interfered with the socialization of deaf children
390

In keeping with this philosophy, which reflects both norm-centered and

privileging attitudes, oralist educators rigorously enforced their view that
speech is superior to sign.39 t Many deaf students experienced harsh
punishment for using sign, including dunking, caning, 392 and having
their hands tied.393
2.

Pathologies and Norms

The heart of the oral/manual debate, as with current arguments over
the existence and extent of Deaf culture, is whether deafness should be

regarded as a pathology, or as a physical trait akin to race, ethnicity, or
even mere hair color. In other words, the debate is between normcentered and difference-oriented perspectives. 94

The traditional, non-deaf conception of deafness classifies it as.
pathology: a deviance from the hearing norm.39' This account of
deafness is empirically true; deaf Americans are a numerical minority 396
of
2.2 to 22 million persons, depending on the definition of "deafness."

ASL users comprise a still smaller minority.397 Aside from numbers,

390. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 106-07.
391. See VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 106-07.
392. See PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 27, at 36-37.
393. See NEISSER, supra note 363, at 30. Even contemporary deaf students who attend oralbased schools fear punishment for using sign. See NEISSER, supra note 363, at 127.
394. See generally LANE, supra note 363; SHAPIRO, supra note '372, at 74-104; James
Woodward, On DepathologizingDeafness, in HEAVEN, supra note 384, at 75-78.
395. Some Deaf culture scholars refer to this account of deafness as "audism." See LANE, supra
note 363, at 43.
396. The lower number better reflects the scope of cultural Deafness. For instance, I am hard
of hearing: I am entirely deaf in my right ear, and I compensate with a hearing aid for recent high
frequency hearing loss in my left ear. I do not consider myself Deaf. I do not know sign language,
I do not read lips, I attended regular classes and schools, and I speak and hear just as the non-deaf
do, with hearing simply being more difficult for me than it is for those with normal hearing. "[T]he
profoundly deaf population is only about 2 million," making deafness a "low-incidence disability."
Solomon, supra note 27, at 66. Although the mid-1960's rubella epidemic swelled America's
deaf population, deafness is becoming increasingly rare. See COHEN, supra note 365, at 270, 274;
Solomon, supra note 27, at 66.
397. In 1983, Arden Neisser estimated that approximately 500,000 deaf Americans use sign.
See NEIssER, supra note 363, at 3, 34-35. At the same time, Neisser noted that this rate of usage
made ASL the "fourth most commonly used language in the United States-after English, Spanish,
and Italian." NEISSER, supra note 363, at 3. The majority of ASL users are the prelingually deaf,
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the pathology view is also true in the sense that the world is designed for
the hearing, so that daily functioning in the hearing world is more
difficult for the deaf than for the hearing.398 In this sense, "deaf people
are disabled. They will always be at a disadvantage. In order for
that
' 399
to change, society's definition of 'normal' would have to change.
Of course, this simple reality poses a conundrum: deafness is
disabling in the sense that everyday life is more difficult with it than
without it; yet, in many ways, the difficulty arises from the design of a
hearing society, rather than from deafness, itself. As Leah Hager Cohen
explains:
If we lived in a society that did not regard hearing people as the norm,
these differences might not constitute deprivations. In fact, in a society
that regarded deafness as the norm, it is likely that hearing people
would be at a disadvantage. But hearing people dominate our society;
it is hearing people's gaze that determines reality. Within this reality
deaf people are disabled.400
a. The Oralism Debate: Difference Becomes Pathology
The traditional characterization of deafness as pathology is based on
more than numbers and functioning. As the history of the Milan
Congress and the oralist movement suggests, many hearing people
regarded the deaf as their inferiors. 40 ' This attitude was especially
pronounced in relation to the non-speaking deaf. Thus, a hearing
educator described deaf signers as .'freaks-dummies' .....
like a
trained 'spaniel' who can 'for a brief time stand on his hind feet ...but
as soon as the restraint of his master's will is removed he capers about
again on four feet."' 4 2 In contrast, "[o]rally trained deaf persons"

who were either born without hearing or lost it before acquiring speech; 90% ofthis group uses sign.
NEISSER, supra note 363, at 8. But see James Woodward, Some Sociolinguistic Problems in the
Implementation ofBilingualEducation ForDeafStudents, in HEAVEN, supra note 384, at 21, 29-30

(estimating 250,000 native ASL users, with ASL "rat[ing] considerably lower than third as a
frequently used foreign language in the U.S.").
398. See generally James Woodward, Some SociolinguisticProblems in the Implementation of
Bilingual Education ForDeaf Students, in HEAVEN, supra note 384, at 75-78.
399. COHEN, supra note 365, at 208.
400. COHEN, supra note 365, at 207.
401. See, e.g., John V. Van Cleve, Nebraska's Oral Law of 1911 and the Deaf Community, 65

NEB. HIST. 195 (Summer 1984) (quoting a 1911 address to the Nebraska Teachers Association by
Carol G. Pearse, superintendent of the Milwaukee, Wisconsin public schools and president of the
National Education Association).
402. Id. at 205.
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were "normal, no longer seriously handicapped, no longer 'dummies,'
no longer objects of pity or contempt."4 3
Some even believed that those who could not speak could not pray.
Thus, the President of the Milan Congress declared:
Oral speech is the sole power that can rekindle the light God breathed
into man when, giving him a soul in a corporeal body, he gave him
also a means of understanding, of conceiving, and of expressing
himself.... While, on the one hand, mimic signs are not sufficient to
express the fullness of thought, on the other they enhance and glorify
fantasy and all the faculties of the sense of imagination ....

The

fantastic language of signs exalts the senses and foments the passions,
whereas speech elevates the mind much more naturally, with calm,
prudence and truth.... Speech alone, divine itself, is the right way to
speak of divine matters. 4 4
Such attitudes reflected the eugenics movement of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Alexander Graham Bell, a
leading proponent of oralism, also subscribed to eugenist ideas.40 5
Thus, Bell objected to sign because he believed that it encouraged
clannishness among the deaf, leading to deaf intermarriage and the
perpetuation of genetic deafness.40 6 To Bell, that scenario was unacceptable, because he "believed that deaf persons weakened the society in
which they lived.' 407 This attitude compelled him to support eugenics:
"[s]ince deafhess seemed incurable, Bell focused his efforts on discover-

403. Id. at 198.
404. LANE, supra note 363, at 114-15. This belief had a long history. The Catholic Church at
one time barred the deaf from taking communion "because they could not confess aloud." COHEN,
supra note 365, at 118. In sixteenth century Spain, this barrier precluded inheritance of properties
and titles; as a result, the history of deaf education begins with the Spanish nobles who wanted their
deaf children to learn to speak. COHEN,supra note 365, at 11; see also Solomon, supra note 27,
at 41. Nor was Catholicism alone in its attitudes towards the non-speaking deaf; "Orthodox Judaism
did not accept Deaf coreligionists unless they could speak." SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 54.
405. Bell was involved in the eugenics movement generally, as well as with a specific emphasis
on the deaf. See LANE, supra note 363, at 213-16.
406. See VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 198. Bell's science, like the rest of the
pseudo-scientific eugenics movement, was simply wrong. Ninety percent of deaf persons have
hearing parents, and 90% of deaf persons have hearing children. See SCHEIN, supranote 27, at 106;
see also Solomon, supranote 27, at 42 (explaining that "at least 30[%] of deafness is genetic, more
than 90[%] of deaf children are born to hearing parents"). As for the scope of the perceived threat,
congenital deafness currently comprises approximately 0.1% of the population. See SACKS, supra
note 365, at xi.
407. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 145. Bell's phrasing echoes Justice Holmes'
view, expressed in Buck v. Bell, that the targets of Virginia's forced sterilization law "sap[ped] the
strength of the State." 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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Nor was Bell

alone in his efforts. Model eugenics laws, and some enacted sterilization
laws, included deaf persons in the categories of social undesirables to be
sterilized.40 9
Surrounded by such negative views of deafhess, many hearing
parents of deaf children understandably preferred-and still prefer-to

see their children use speech rather than sign. 4"0 Hearing parents often
felt that the paramount goal for their children was the acquisition 411
of
speech, which would enable them to "pass" as "normal" persons.
Thus, their decisions for their deaf children-confusing and difficult to
start with-were shaped by the perceived necessity of speech for
"normalcy" and assimilation within the hearing world.4 12
b. The Cochlear Implant Debate: Seeking A Cure For Difference

Cochlear implant technology is a modem flashpoint for the issues

408. VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 145.
409. See LANE, supra note 363, at 215-16; Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter,
NATURAL HisT., July 1984, at 14. Under the Third Reich's eugenics program, nearly 4,000 of the
375,000 persons who underwent forced sterilization did so on the basis of blindness or deafness.
Id. While the most striking numbers come from Germany's Nazi experience, the eugenist
philosophy was not uniquely Nazi. See STEFAN KUHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION (1994). To the
contrary, German eugenicists were inspired by Justice Holmes' decision in Buck and impressed by
U.S. sterilization rates. Id. at 24, 38.
410. As Jerome Schein explains, hearing parents "know little or nothing about deafness and less
about Deaf people. They cannot rely on their own experience for guidance. They lack empathy for
their deaf child's behavior. They feel cut off from the child; they have difficulty understanding
the child and greater difficulty making the child understand them." SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 107.
Moreover, hearing parents feel their signing children become alienated from them, more at home in
the residential schools' visual milieu than with their speaking parents. See VAN CLEVE & CROUCH,
supra note 380, at 198. In fact, many deaf residential school alumni report just such sensations of
alienation from non-signing, speaking parents, and a feeling of being "at home" in the school setting.
See generally PADDEN & HUMPHRIES, supra note 27; SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 1-2. Deaf culture
therefore emphasizes school ties, and most Deaf refer to their educational histories when they
introduce themselves. See LANE, supra note 363, at 17; Dolnick, supra note 365, at 52.
411. LANE, supranote 363, at 199; see also VAN CLEVE & CROUCH, supra note 380, at 106-07.
Some deaf persons shared these sentiments. Alexander Graham Bell's wife, Mabel Bell, preferred
to "pass" as a hearing person. She
[strove] in every way to have [her deafness] forgotten and to be so completely normal
that [she] would pass as [hearing]. To have anything to do with other deaf people
instantly brought this hard-concealed fact into evidence. So [she] ...helped other things
and people ... anything, everything but the deaf. [She] would have no friends among
them.
LANE, supra note 363, at 98 (quoting Mabel Bell).
412. See, e.g., LANE, supranote 363, at 154-62; THOMAs SPRADLEY & JAMES SPRADLEY, DEAF
LIKE ME (1978) (hearing parents' account of early years with their deaf daughter).
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argued in the oralism debate. Using a procedure approved by the FDA
in 1985,413 surgeons implant "a tiny chip ... in the inner
ear ... connected to a magnet just under the skin, which attracts another
magnet in a transmitter attached behind the ear."414 From the transmitter magnet, a "wire leads ... to a 'speech processor' you can clip to
your belt." 41 5 This device "converts sound into electrical impulses and
sends them to the implant, which conveys them to the brain, where they
are processed as sound would be. The result is an approximation of
'
hearing. "416
The effectiveness of the procedure depends upon the implantee;
specifically, those who have late-onset, post-lingual deafness are the best
candidates for the procedure.417 For other deaf persons, particularly

those who are prelingually deaf, the implant's value is at best questionable, and, for some, non-existent. Thus, some estimate that "[fjewer than
Americans with hearing impairments can
[one] percent of the 22 million
t 8
benefit from the operation."'

413. Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
414. Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
415. Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
416. Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
417. Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
418. SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at 224 (finding "[f]ewer than [one] percent of the 22 million
Americans with hearing impairments can benefit from the operation"); Solomon, supra note 27, at
65. Solomon reports that "[p]relingual deaf adults who have the implants often find them ineffective
or just irritating." Solomon, supra note 27, at 65. Even a post-lingually deaf man told Solomon that
the implant "made everyone sound like R2D2 with laryngitis.' Solomon, supra note 27, at 65. But
see Bonnie P. Tucker, Deafness-Disabilityor Subculture: The Emerging Conflict, 3 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 265, 267 (1994). Professor Tucker states that "[c]ochlear implants have enabled
some profoundly deaf people to understand speech without having to rely on speech reading or
interpreters," and she predicts that continued technological advances "will enable profoundly deaf
people to understand speech in most circumstances." Id. at 267-68. The most controversial use of
the technology is with prelingually deaf children. Implants in children who have not yet acquired
language may be ineffective because those children have no means of interpreting any sound they
perceive, and because the sound they receive through the implant is "too garbled" to be interpreted
as language. See LANE, supra note 363, at 4. If such children receive implants and then are
deprived of exposure to sign, they can end up entirely without language. See Solomon, supra note
27, at 4-5, 65. Compounding these risks is the fact that the surgery "destroys all residual hearing
a child might have.' Solomon, supra note 27, at 65. These problems are especially significant in
light of the fact that "antibiotics have tamed many of the childhood diseases that once caused
permanent loss of hearing, [so] more than 90[%] of all deaf children in the United States today were
born deaf or lost their hearing before they learned English.' Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39. In
other words, the majority of potential child implantees may be least suited to the technology. See
THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATION OF THE DEAF, ToW~ARD EQUALITY: EDUCATION OF THE DEAF
125 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATION OF THE DEAF] (report to the
President and Congress). But see Solomon, supra note 27, at 65 (stating that "implants are most
effective when put in children at about age [two].").
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From the Deaf point of view, the notion that implants are beneficial
"is both inappropriate and offensive-as if doctors and newspapers
joyously announced advances in genetic engineering that might someday
make it possible to turn black skin white."4 9 Deaf activists deem the
implantation procedure brutally invasive,4 2' despite its actual relative
safety.4 21 For themselves, "[eighty-six] percent of deaf adults said they
would not want a cochlear implant even if it were free. 4 22 As for
children, the Deaf view is that
'[a]n implant is... the ultimate denial of deafness, the ultimate refusal
to let deaf children be Deaf .... Parents who choose to have their
children implanted, are in effect saying, "I don't respect the Deaf
community, and I certainly don't want my child to be part of it. I
want him/her
to be part of the hearing world, not the Deaf
,, 4 3
world. 2
Whether one agrees with implantation's proponents or detractors,
it is clear that the debate turns upon competing accounts of "normalcy."
For the non-deaf parents who choose implantation for their children, and

for the deaf who elect implantation, "normalcy" entails an approximation
of hearing and speech.424

For the Deaf who reject implantation

technology, "normalcy" entails immersion in Deaf culture and communication via manual language.425 In one view, deafness is a pathology;
in the other view, deafness is depathologized,4 26 even "an identity to

419. Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
420. See, e.g., LANE, supra note 363, at 3-4 (although non-deaf, Lane shares the Deaf culture

perspective, and graphically describes implantation procedures in sensationalized, negative terms);
Tucker, supra note 418, at 271 (quoting former National Association of the Deaf Executive
Director's view that implants are a form of "assault," and "analogous to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait or the beating of a blind man in order to induce him to see stars.').
421. See Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
422. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 43 (citing a survey reported by Harlan Lane),
423. Dolnick,supra note 365, at 43 (quoting DeafLife editorial), In other words, the Deaf view
cochlear implantation as an attack on Deaf culture's existence. See SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at
224. In fact, "in England the sign language symbol used for cochlear implant is the same one as
'to kill."' SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at 224.
424. Cochlear implants do not really provide "normal" hearing, even when fully effective. As
Andrew Solomon puts it, they "do something that looks like hearing. They give you a process that
is (sometimes) rich in information and (usually) free of music. They make the hearing world easier,
but they do not give you hearing." Solomon, supra note 27, at 65.
425. See SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at 224; LANE, supra note 363, at 5-6.
426. See James Woodward, On DepathologizingDeafness,in HEAVEN, supranote 384, at 75-78.
See generally LANE, supra note 363, at 3-31.
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be adopted with pride." 427
The Deaf reaction is psychologically understandable. According to
the pathology model, the deaf are at best abnormal and pitiable; at worst,
they are deviant and less than fully human.428 In contrast, the Deaf
culture model provides a much more positive sense of self. Thus, those
deaf who think of Deafness as culture rejoice if their child is born
deaf.429 These feelings run so strong that a hearing reporter at the
National Association of the Deaf convention felt it was "impossible, [at
3
the convention], not to wish you were Deaf.""4
Apart from psychological appeal, the pathology model and the Deaf
culture model suggest different means of responding to the practical
effects of deafness. The question is: which model is most functional?
Not surprisingly, Deaf activists argue that the Deaf culture approach is
more functional.43 1
Their reasons for rejecting the pathology/assimilation model are instructive for difference analysis.
3.

Function or Assimilation: The Trade-Off

The oralism and cochlear implant debates center on whether the deaf
function best in the hearing world by assimilating--becoming as nearly
like hearing persons as possible--or by bringing Deaf culture into the
hearing world.432 From the hearing perspective, assimilation seems the
preferable, perhaps even the only, option, because deafness seems
unacceptable. 433 From this premise, it follows that speech and lip

427. SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at 224. Shapiro recounts a parallel debate over emerging
technology that uses electrodes to stimulate paraplegics' leg muscles, producing "a jerky, torturous
version of walking ....
[Which] overstimulates muscles, leaving users exhausted even after short
distances." SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at 225. While this technology seemingly offers "normalcy"
in place of wheelchairs, some argue that it would be "[b]etter... to take the money spent
on ... [such] research and study ways to build better wheelchairs or to replace architectural
barriers." SHAPIRO, supra note 372, at 225. In other words, wheelchair use is not necessarily
undesirable in and of itself; rather, it is made undesirable by the difficulties created when it is
regarded as abnormal, and its exigencies are excluded from the design of the everyday world. See
generally JOHN HOCKENBERRY, MOVING VIOLATIONS (1995).
428. See LANE, supra note 363, at 3-31; see also supra notes 402-12 and accompanying text.
429. See Dolnick, supra note 365, at 38 (stating that "many deaf parents cheer on discovering
that their baby is deaf.").
430. Solomon, supra note 27, at 45.
43 1. See, e.g., LANE supra note 363 at 3-31 (non-deaf author explaining the Deaf view of the
pathology model); James Woodward, How You Gonna Get to Heaven If You Can't Talk With
Jesus: The EducationalEstablishment vs. The Deaf Community, in HEAVEN, supra note 384, at 11,
13; James Woodward, On DepathologizingDeafness, in HEAVEN, supra note 384, at 75-78.
432. See James Woodward, supra note 384, at 15-17, 75-78.
433. See Dolnick, supra note 365, at 37.
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reading comprise the best means of communication for the deaf, because
they permit (theoretically) the deaf to pass as non-deaf, and thereby to
assimilate into the hearing world.4 34 These same ideas motivated the
Milan Congress, 4 3 and formed the basis of the subsequent oral/manual
debates.
While the ultimate effectiveness of cochlear implant technology is
yet to be determined, the results of oralism's dominance are well
documented, both empirically and anecdotally. 36 These results do not
point solely in one direction; however, the lion's share of the evidence
suggests that the Milan Congress's
approach was a practical mistake,
4 37
merit.
philosophical
its
whatever
The empirical evidence of educational achievement using oral
methods is discouraging.
The average deaf sixteen-year-old reads at the level of a hearing eightyear-old. When deaf students eventually leave school, three in four are
unable to read a newspaper. Only two deaf children in a hundred
(compared with forty in a hundred among the general population) go
on to college. Many deaf students write English as if it were a foreign
language. 43

The empirical evidence of oralism's efficacy for daily functioning
is likewise discouraging. With respect to speech, "[b]arely [ten] percent
of oral students actually mastered intelligible speech. ' 4" 39 Even their
teachers "[judge] the speech of two thirds of them to be hard to
understand or unintelligible.""
One deaf superintendent of a school
for the deaf estimates that "[tihe vast majority of deaf children will never
develop intelligible speech for the general public."44 ' Speech acquisition is especially difficult for the prelingually deaf,442 who comprise

434. See generally LANE, supra note 363, at 139-72.

435. Given the rhetoric of the Milan Congress, one wonders if its participants would have voted
to force cochlear implants upon the deaf, just as they forced oral methods upon the deaf community,

and eugenicists forced sterilizations upon persons deemed undesirable. See supranotes 376-81, 40709 and accompanying text.

In this light, Deaf activists' polemics against implants have an

historical basis, however extreme their conclusions may appear.
436.
437.
438.
439.

NEIssER, supra note 363, at 8.
See generally, Lane, supra note 363, at 119-20.
Dolnick, supra note 365, at 40.
NEISSER, supra note 363, at 8.

440. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 47-48 (describing results of an unspecified study).
441. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 47-48.
442. SCHEIN supra note 27, at 32.
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approximately ninety-five percent of deaf American children." 3 Lip
reading's results are equally discouraging: "the average deaf person
with a decade of practice [is] no better at lip-reading than a hearing
Lip reading poorly serves its deaf
person picked off the street."'
users because "the greatest aid to lip-reading is knowing how words
sound." ' Absent such knowledge, "only [forty] percent of the sounds
produced in the English language is visible on the lips.""' 6 Hence, the
rate of understanding for deaf children without residual hearing may be
as low as five percent." 7 "In tests using simple sentences, deaf people
recognize perhaps three or four words in every ten.""'48 Comprehension
of the remainder depends upon "gathering meaning from context, from
facial expression, and from guessing." 449
Put together, emphasis on speech and lip reading generally hinders
rather than helps language acquisition. By age five, deaf students in oral
kindergarten programs learn "perhaps fifty words. At the same time, a
child with normal hearing has a vocabulary of several thousand
words. ' 5 Numerous studies suggest that orally educated deaf never
close this early gap; if anything, it widens. 5 ' In contrast, deaf children
exposed early to ASL-the ten percent "deaf of deaf"--fare much better.
Just as non-deaf children of non-deaf parents begin language acquisition
with nonsense babbling, so do deaf children of ASL-using deaf parents
"babble" in sign.4 11 Their ASL acquisition then proceeds at a rate
comparable to that of their hearing peers' acquisition of spoken
language. 53

443. THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATION OF THE DEAF, supra note 418, at 15. Some speculate
that oralism's heyday at the turn of the century may have stemmed from its relatively good

prospects for success with that era's deaf population, which included many more postlingually deaf
persons than does today's deaf population. See NEISSER, supra note 363, at 25. Even then, results
did not reach the ideal of perfect speech. Neisser describes Mabel Bell's exhaustive work: she had
"articulation lessons throughout childhood .... [was] sent to Germany to work with special tutors,
and was Bell's private pupil for years." NEISSER, supra note 363, at 29. Bell was satisfied with
the results, which enabled family and friends to understand his wife, but "her articulation was never
considered good." NEISSER, supra note 363, at 29.
444. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39-40 (describing a British study of the efficacy of lip-reading).
445. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39-40.
446. THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATION OF THE DEAF, supra note 418, at 15.
447. THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATION OF THE DEAF, supra note 418, at 15.

448. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39.
449. NEISSER, supra note 363, at 23.
450. NEISSER, supra note 363, at 8.
451. See LANE, supra note 363, at 130-32; James Woodward, Some Sociolinguistic Problems
in the Implementation of BilingualEducation ForDeafStudents, in HEAVEN, supra note 384, at 37.
452. See Dolnick, supra note 365, at 40.
453. See Dolnick, supra note 365, at 40; see also NEISSER, supra note 363, at 8.
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Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that an oral emphasis not only
hinders language acquisition, but also hampers general education because
the attempt to learn speech absorbs so much time."'" One deaf graduate of a leading oral school recalls 'spen[ding] two weeks learning to
say "guillotine" and that was what we learned about the French Revolution."' '455 Perhaps out of resentment, some Deaf describe their speech
classes in bitter terms. "'The emphasis was on English, and we were hit
if we were caught talking with our hands. The speech teacher couldn't
sign, and I used to hate having to touch her throat and neck, to learn the
sounds to make, and smelling her breath.""' 56 Even after all of this
effort, "[t]he majority of pre-lingually deaf students couldn't master
speech or lip-reading ....
Consequently, they missed most of what was
taught in the classroom, and, upon leaving school, entered a kind of
' 57
underclass of the deaf."
Even those who have successfully mastered speech and lip reading
do not necessarily find it efficacious. Instead, they use speech selfconsciously.458 As for lip reading, they may find it exhausting." 9
One skilled lip-reader explains: "'even with peak conditions ... good
lighting, high energy level, and a person who
articulates well, I'm still
' 60
lips."'
the
on
see
I
what
of
half
guessing at
Given the empirical and anecdotal results of oralism, only two
factors justify it.161 One factor is assimilation: manual communication
marks its users as deaf, whereas oral communication enables the deaf to
pass as non-deaf."62 This factor is a norm-centered proposition. The

454. See generally LANE, supranote 363, at 132-33 ("[m]any schools became, in effect, speech

clinics'); Dolnick, supra note 365, at 48 ("deaf students were forced for hour upon hour to try to
pronounce "English words they had never heard").
455. Solomon, supra note 27, at 41.
456. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 52 (quoting recollections of Patrick Graybill).
457. Michael D'Antonio, Sound & Fury, L.A. TIMES MAO., Nov. 21, 1993, at 44, 48; see also
id. at 64 (reporting Deaf advocates' argument that "many students miss valuable school time
struggling through speech therapy sessions).
458. See SCHEIN, supra note 27, at 33 (quoting one Deaf person as saying "speaking is like
walking about in public naked').
459. See Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39.
460. Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39.
461. Not all deaf are uncomfortable with oralism, and those who prefer it stress its value for
assimilation with the hearing world. See, e.g., LEw GOLAN, READING BETWEEN THE LIPs (1995);
HENRY KISOR, WHAT'S THAT PIG OUTDOORS

(1990).

462. Of course, this advantage is more theoretical than real for most deaf persons. The reality
is that most deaf speak differently from the non-deaf. Thus, Heather Whitestone has mastered
speech, but radio "personality" Howard Stern imitates and ridicules her voice. Similarly, lip reading
enables avoidance of sign, but it does not provide anything like full comprehension. See supra text
accompanying notes 382-87.
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other factor is integration: direct463 communication with the non-deaf
who do not know any manual languages requires oral methods. This is
both a norm-centered and a privileging proposition, which assumes that
oral communication is the norm, and non-deaf use of manual communication would be special treatment of the deaf.
Functionality considerations throw both factors' underpinnings into
doubt. Assimilation offers nothing in the way of enhancing functionality;
to the contrary, it impedes it.4 64 Superficially, the integration factor
enhances functionality, but this appearance is deceptive. Unlike ADA
accommodations, oralism's effects are not achieved through a change in
the environment.465 Instead, oralism's effects are achieved solely
through the efforts of the deaf person who uses speech and lip reading.466 If they choose, the non-deaf participants in the exchange can
assist the effort by speaking clearly, facing the deaf person, and keeping
their faces uncovered.467 The non-deaf participants may also choose
to do nothing, and leave the work-and any comprehension problems---to the deaf participant. Indeed, the more assimilation and
"passing" is the goal, the less is asked of the non-deaf, so as to minimize
the deaf person's difference. Thus, assimilation and efficacy are
inversely related: the more assimilation is achieved, the greater the effort
and potential loss of efficacy is required.
4.

Assimilation's Costs

The Deaf experience demonstrates that stamping out difference
exacts a cost. This cost falls upon the non-deaf as well as the deaf. Oral
communication methods are inefficient for all participants, both because
they are time-consuming, and because they impede full communication.4 6' Thus, hearing consumers count communication difficulties with

463. I use the term "direct" to distinguish deaf/non-deaf communication via interpreters.
464. See supra notes 438-60 and accompanying text.

465. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1993) (EEOC guidelines for interpretation and application of
the ADA) (describing accommodations as work environment or method changes that enable disabled
individuals to enjoy equal employment opportunities).
466. As one president of an oral-based school said, '[it's unlikely ... that the rest of the
world is going to learn sign language just to accommodate to the deaf. The deaf have to
accommodate to the hearing."' NEISSER, supra note 363, at 126.
467. See generally DOROTHY J. STEFFANIC, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR DEAF EMPLOYEES IN WHITE COLLAR JOBS 8-9 (Apr. 1982).

468. When Edward Dolnick interviewed Cheryl Heppner, a skilled lipreader who can speak, their
"conversation ground to a halt every sentence or two." Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39. Dolnick

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

67

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 13:2

deaf as a transaction cost, and will deal with the deaf "only if [they can]
offer quality and price which [are] advantageous enough" to overshadow
the costs of communication difficulties. 469 The total impact of the
resulting discrimination and underemployment has been estimated to
reduce deaf earnings "by almost [two-thirds].""47
Oral methods also exact costs by reducing deaf persons' productivity. Numerous studies suggest that deaf persons' cognitive functioning
is best in manual communication situations.471 Although this notion of
reduced cognitive functioning seems abstract, it can create dollars and
cents losses. Such losses inure to employers as well as to employees,
because a deaf employee forced to use oral methods generally will not
be maximizing his or her effectiveness. This is not to say that the deaf
are unproductive, or bad, employees; rather, the point is that a normcentered policy of oral communication would preclude the deaf
employee's realization of his or her full potential.
These costs exact a heavy price for an approximation of normalcy.
This bottom line is expressed strikingly in Lawrence Newsman's
allegorical depiction of a society that insists that blind persons read by
47 rather than Braille:
using their "residual sight,""
Which is more important, John kept asking himself: to assume an
appearance of normalcy with ten percent vision that stumbles and
staggers, OR to admit having a sight impairment, letting the world
know it, and using braille to advance and ensure his place in that
world. Which? Which? 473

"had great difficulty making out Heppner's soft, high-pitched speech, and far more often than not
[his] questions and comments were met only with her mouthed 'Sorry.' In frustration [they]
resorted to typing on her computer." Dolnick, supra note 365, at 39.
469. LEO M. JACOBS, A DEAF ADULT SPEAKS OUT 98 (3d ed. 1989).

470. Id. at 102. Jacobs describes an economist's 1972 study on the costs of deafness. Through
a series of calculations, the economist concluded that "the average hearing worker could expect to
earn $392,613 during his/her lifetime. Using the same figuring, he found that the average deaf

employee could earn only $132,538 during his/her lifetime. Therefore, the cost of deafness is
S260,075." Id. (describing a study performed by Dr. John E. Weinrich). Of course, this picture of
the economic costs of deafness is drawn from multiple causes, and not just the question of
communication methods. Nonetheless, as Jacobs argues, communication methods pose the primary
obstacle to deaf opportunity. Id. at 100.
471. See LANE, supra note 363, at 181-85 (asserting the advantages of bilingual ASL-English
education); NEISSER, supra note 363, at 82-85, 92-93; SACKS, supra note 365, at 94-95, 112-13.
472. This phrase refers to oralists' emphasis on use of "residual hearing," augmented by
hearing aids, lipreading, and speech, rather than the visual communication systems that obviate any
need for hearing.
473. Lawrence Newsman, See! See! See! See, in A DEAF ADULT SPEAKS OUT, supra note
469, at 167, 169.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol13/iss2/1

68

19961

Maatman: Listening to Deaf Culture: A Reconceptualization of Difference An

Deaf Culture: A New Difference Analysis Under Title VII

What of integration? Oral methods appear indispensable, despite
their costs, because hearing people usually do not know sign. Therefore,
Deaf insistence upon sign seemingly cuts short any prospect of communication. This calculation of sign's costs may be illusory. For one thing,
sign language interpreters can be employed. 4 4 More significantly,
there is no inherent barrier to ASL literacy amongst the hearing. Indeed,
this possibility is demonstrably real: an entire hearing and deaf
community of sign language users once existed on Martha's Vineyard,
where original settlement and subsequent marriage patterns produced a
relatively high proportion of deaf residents.4 "5
On Martha's Vineyard, the deaf population's size made "a
knowledge of the language ... a necessity., 76 Most hearing Islanders
learned sign language in childhood, and so became bilingual.477
"Hearing members of the community were so accustomed to using signs
that the language found its way into discussions even when no deaf
people were present." 47 Perhaps because all Vineyarders used sign,
manual communication imposed no stigma on its users. To the contrary,
"deaf men and women [on the Island] ... were not handicapped, because
no one perceived their deafness as a handicap.' '
Moreover, deaf
Vineyarders functioned on equal terms with their hearing counterparts.
By economic measures, the deaf did as well as, or better, than their
hearing counterparts.4 0
B.

Principles For Difference Analysis

If the ADA did not exist, and the deaf were a protected group under
474. Sign language interpreters are subject to stringent training, certification, and ethical
requirements. Although their numbers are limited, they are increasing. See generallyCOHEN, supra
note 365. But see LANE, supra note 363, at 136 (criticizing low standards for ASL interpreters).

475. See NORA E. GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN (1985).
476. Id. at 55. "The language" was not ASL, but an indigenous sign language. The Vineyard
sign language shared ASL characteristics, perhaps because many Vineyard deaf children attended

the Hartford School for the deaf, and acquired-or contributed to--evolving ASL. See id. at 71, 74.
477. Id. at 4, 53.

478. Id. at 63.
479. Id. at 110 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 4 (hearing Vineyarders did not regard their
deaf neighbors as handicapped).

480. Id. at 80-85 (describing equal pictures presented by tax, census, bank and other records for
deaf and non-deaf Vineyarders). These results contrasted with those for mainland deaf persons
during the same time period. Id. at 85. Of course, as Groce acknowledges, deaf islanders may have
enjoyed economic success because the Island's economy was relatively simple. Id. at 107.
Nonetheless, Groce concludes that the Island economy was sufficiently sophisticated that its structure
cannot fully explain the deaf population's success. Id. at 107-08.
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Title VII, current difference analysis would force selection of assimilation
over functionality. Employers who chose to do so could forbid the use
of sign amongst their deaf employees, much as English-only rules
survive scrutiny under Spun Steak's approach to cultural difference. 481
Employers could even exclude deaf employees lacking hearing aids or
cochlear implants, or terminate employees who refused to obtain these
devices. After all, such policies would not be directed explicitly against
the deaf; rather, they would be directed at deafness plus lack of the
desired norm. Under4 2existing difference analysis, that approach would
not violate Title VII. 8
Of course, employers who chose that route would hurt themselves.
Even assuming that deaf workers were willing to forgo their "preference"
for sign, these employees would be less functional than they would be
if permitted to use sign. Even if the policy left the employer with deaf
persons fully comfortable with oral methods, the employer would have
reduced the size of its prospective labor pool, thereby driving up its wage
costs. 483 In this light, dispensing with norm-centered equality and
permitting the use of sign would not privilege difference. To the
contrary, it would simply be good business sense.
Seen in these terms, the Deaf culture model makes plain the
deficiencies of difference analysis and the equality debate, with their
themes of norm-centered equality and difference as privilege. At the
same time, the Deaf culture model offers four principles for
reconceptualizing difference analysis in a way that better realizes equality
of opportunity, and better balances employer and employee interests.
These four principles are: (1) mutability may be illusory; (2) forcing
conformance to a norm upon holders of purportedly mutable characteristics may reduce their functionality; (3) far from working a one-sided
"privilege," accommodation of difference will reduce assimilation's costs
for both employers and employees; and (4) difference only matters
because of social artifice. The first two principles serve to reject the

481. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 F.3d 296 (9th Cir. 1993).
482. Cf. Tucker, supra note 418, at 272-74 (suggesting that the Deaf culture argument logically
requires a Title VII approach that would withhold accommodation from those deaf who refuse
cochlear implants).
483. Cf. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

30 (2d ed. 1988). "[I]t is not clear how discrimination could long exist in a competitive model. An
employer that discriminates ... has artificially contracted its supply of available labor and therefore

has tended to raise the price of labor it purchases." Id. Admittedly, this disincentive is more
theoretical thah real in an oversupplied labor market. In the deaf situation, chronic underemployment
and unemployment might preclude any actual wage effect.
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Willingham I1 test and its concomitant sex-plus analysis. The second two
principles serve to replace current difference analysis with themes that
realize equality of opportunity and an employee-employer balance.
1. Mutability May Be Illusory
Current difference analysis uses Willingham 1!'s concepts of
mutability and fundamental rights to determine whether an employer's
policy violates Title VII. The sensitivity of this approach therefore
depends-at least, in part-upon the accuracy of mutability determinations. The deaf experience suggests that such determinations may be
inaccurate, especially when judges, like employers, evaluate difference
in pathologizing, norm-centered terms. Moreover, the mutability test
reinforces norm-centered thinking (and its illogic) by laying the blame,
and the solutions, for difference at the feet of those who do not meet
existing norms.4
The results of such determinations are questionable. For example,
cochlear implant technology permits the argument that deafhess is
mutable.485 Yet, this supposed mutability is hardly a simple change for
the deaf; it requires an intrusive operation that can often fall short of real
effectiveness. Similarly, judges deciding difference cases have assumed
that hair straightening, weight reduction, infant weaning, and the use of
a non-primary language is both easily achieved and desirable.
2.

Forcing Conformance to a Norm May Reduce Functionality

ilingham II's fundamental rights inquiry asks whether the
employer's policy requires employees to forgo a mere preference, so that
a ruling for the employer treats the employee's desire for difference as
an unfair request for privileged treatment. The deaf experience teaches
that this approach mistakenly assumes that "pathology" and "norms" are
objectively defined categories, such that the dominant group modes of
functioning are deemed best for everybody. As the oralists demonstrated,
those who lack the experience of difference overestimate the value of
norm-conforming, and underestimate the value of differentiated
484. See Tucker, supra note 418 (suggesting that a logical consequence of further cochlear
implant advances would be a refusal of ADA accommodations for those Deaf who refuse implants);
see also Jerome MeCristal Culp, Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race And Culture, 92
MICH. L. REv. 2613 (1994) (hypothetical debate on whether equality problems can and should be
solved by having African Americans take a pill that makes them white).
485. See Tucker, supra note 418, at 267-68.
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functioning.
3.

Assimilation's Costs Make Accommodation Desirable

In the employment context, the themes of norm-centered equality
and difference as privilege exact costs upon all parties.48 6 The employer who refuses to "privilege" an employee's difference gains normconformance, but loses productivity. Assuming the employee is not
entirely cut off from employment opportunity, the employee may suffer
diminished evaluations, discipline, and discharge for the poor productivity, which may be blamed upon the employee rather than on the
inadequate mode of functioning forced upon the employee.
4.

Difference Matters Only Because of Social Artifice

The fourth Deaf culture principle suggests that norm-conformance
is not worth the price employees and employers pay to obtain it. To the
contrary, the value of the appearance is merely a self-perpetuating social
construct. In the Deaf culture context, the advantage offered by oralism
is that it permits--theoretically, at least-deaf integration with hearing
society, by hiding deafhess with an appearance of hearing. Not only is
this advantage illusory for those deaf who cannot produce intelligible
speech, but it also fails all deaf, because even the best lip readers cannot
comprehend all that the non-deaf can hear.
This fourth Deaf culture principle echoes some equality theorists,
who have recently argued that difference is "relational," and not intrinsic.
In this view, "attributions of difference reflect choices by those in power
about what characteristics should matter.""4 7
The principle also
parallels the well-established Title VII rule that customer preference
generally cannot support a BFOQ defense, especially
when that
48
reality.
than
rather
artifice
of
product
a
is
preference

486. See generally supra notes 468-75 and accompanying text.
487. Martha Minow, JusticeEngendered,in FOUNDATIONS, supranote 14, at 304; see generally
Minow, supra note 22,at 128; cf.Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513-21 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (finding military's refusal to permit serviceman to wear a yarmulke treats Christianity
as a norm and irrationally differentiates yarmulkes from other religious articles).
488. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993) (customer survey
revealed merely lukewarm support for no beard policy); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting employer's BFOQ defense of female-only flight attendant
policy because the "necessity" of fulfilling customer expectations of an all-female attendant crew was
created by the employer's own advertising campaign); cf Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205
(8th Cir. 1985) (grooming policies prompted by customer preferences are justifiable in a business
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Deaf culture principles and Title VII recognize that appearance is
valuable only because norm-centered social constructs make it so. As the
Martha's Vineyard experience suggests, appearance ceases to matter
once difference is depathologized. Instead of asking the deaf to attempt
speech-much less obtain cochlear implants-hearing Vineyarders
signed, and thought little of the fact that they did so. On Martha's
Vineyard, sign was not a difference; rather, it was a part of daily life for
both the non-deaf and deaf.4 89
V. APPLICATION OF NEW DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS THEMES: A
PROPOSED APPROACH

The four Deaf culture principles compel rejection of the themes of
norm-centered equality and difference as privilege. In their place, courts
should read Title VII to achieve equality of opportunity, and appropriately balance employer and employee interests.490 If they do so, courts
can approach difference cases in a manner that recognizes that policies
directed at stereotyped, biological, or cultural differences may be
discriminatory. They can also recognize that such policies may thwart
the interests of all parties by reducing the functionality of affected
employees. What follows is a practical Title VII test designed to meet
these goals.
A plaintiff challenging an employer's norm-centered policy should
establish the policy's effect on employee traits in one of the three
difference areas. That is, the plaintiffs prima facie disparate treatment
case491 should include a showing either that the policy in question
explicitly discriminates against a statutory category, or discriminates
against characteristics stereotypically, biologically, or culturally
associated with a statutory category.

based on a visual medium). But see Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (grooming rules are a reasonable management prerogative because employee
appearance contributes to the image and success of a business).
489. GROCE, supra note 475, at 56.
490. A judicial solution to the problem is preferable to a Congressional solution because the
difficulties of difference analysis are more susceptible to case by case treatment than to an attempt
to catalog covered differences in the statute itself. The PDA demonstrates the ultimate shortcomings
of such an approach. See supra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
491. I suggest disparate treatment analysis on the theory that policies directed at the three
difference areas are directed at statutory categories; put another way, a disparate treatment approach
recognizes that difference analysis poses a construction problem focused on the scope of Title ViI's
protected categories. Moreover, the approach I suggest requires a rather simple modification of the
present scheme of proof of disparate treatment.
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Once the plaintiff establishes this prima facie case, the burden of
production should shift to the defendant, just as it does in current
disparate treatment analysis. Under Texas Dep 't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine492 and St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks,4 93 the employer
may argue that its treatment of plaintiff was unrelated to its normcentered policy.494 If the employer cannot meet this burden of production, then the case is necessarily one of mixed motives495 or discrimination.4 96
In either case, the inquiry would proceed to a BFOQ analysis of the
employer's policy. As in current BFOQ analysis, the employer can
justify a policy that is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
its particular business or enterprise. 497 By the same token, an employer
that cannot meet this BFOQ test will not be entitled to retain its policy.
This should be the result even if the policy does not interfere with
plaintiffs functioning, for a discriminatory policy that cannot be
justified as a BFOQ falls outside the bounds of Title VII's balance of
employer and employee interests.
In keeping with current BFOQ analysis, an employer who can meet
the terms of this narrow defense has established that its policy is a
legitimate business practice in the sense permitted by Title VII.
Nonetheless, the BFOQ inquiry in a difference case should be modified
to additionally inquire Whether the employer's policy hampers the
employee's functioning. This modification corrects the norm-centered
distortions of current difference analysis, and parallels the Title VII
principle that discrimination consists of practices that cut off employment
opportunity.

498

Courts can undertake this modified inquiry by directly examining
whether the policy at issue interferes with the plaintiffs work perfor-

492. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
493. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).

494. Id. at 2747.
495. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993) (plaintiff establishes discrimination on a
demonstration that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor'); see also
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
496. If the defendant meets its burden, plaintiff would proceed to proof of pretext in the manner
prescribed by the Hicks decision. In difference cases, that showing would presumably require a
demonstration that the defendant's articulation of a non-difference oriented reason for its actions
is untrue.
497. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988) (BFOQ defense); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc,,
499 U.S. 187, 200-01 (1991).
498. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
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mance, thus making it "more difficult to do the job."4 99 In the alternative, courts may inquire whether there is a "reasonable but less discriminatory alternative" to the employer's policy. This second prong would
essentially graft together business necessity and reasonable accommodation concepts. For example, the employer in Elie would be required to
have another floor worker assist plaintiff on the occasions during the
remaining four months of her pregnancy that required heavy lifting.
This BFOQ modification benefits employers as well as employees;
by incorporating into differences analysis a set of principles that respect
difference in a way that serves all parties' interests in the best possible
employee performance. Even with respect to non-functional differences-such as hair length-this approach makes sense. Usually, employers
implement policies directed at non-functional differences for the sake of
an image.5" 0 Difference analysis has permitted employers to do this for
two reasons. First, norm-centered distortions have persuaded judges that
the practices are not discriminatory.5 ' Second, norm-centered distortions have persuaded judges and businesses that such policies make
business sense. 02 Both reasons heavily rely on the supposition that
adherence to norms really matter. As the deaf experience teaches, that
supposition is false.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Title VII's paramount goals are equality of opportunity and an
appropriate balance of employee rights with employers' legitimate
interests. In Title VII cases involving policies directed at stereotyped,
biological, and cultural differences, the themes of norm-centered equality
and difference as privilege have thwarted these goals. The long-debated
equal and special treatment equality models have not solved the problems
created by these difference analysis themes. To the contrary, they ignore
the full scope of difference analysis, and inadequately address its themes.
The cultural experience of the Deaf yields principles that replace the

499. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(discriminatory conduct "unreasonably interferes" with work performance, altering work conditions
so as to 'make it more difficult to do the job').
500. See, e.g., Willingham I, 507 F.2d at 1084; Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d

1115 (D.D.C. 1973).
501. If they had deemed the policies discriminatory, most would have fallen under the general
rule that customer preferences cannot be used as a BFOQ. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.,
517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
502. Cf Willingham I, 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973) (Simpson, J., dissenting).
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distorting themes of difference analysis with themes that reflect and
further Title VII's goals of equality of opportunity and balanced
employee and employer interests. Using Deaf culture principles, courts
can apply disparate treatment analysis and a modified BFOQ test to
realize Title VII's goals.
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